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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 
Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, human-
centered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings 
with nature.  Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume 
that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the 
environmental degradations associated with our species.  On the other hand, a handful 
of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a 
foundation for environmental ethics.  According to Bryan Norton’s convergence 
hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a 
nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably 
broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11).  Norton notes that 
although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the 
various reasons they have for advocating such policies, they nevertheless share an equal 
commitment to protecting the environment.  Because any form of anthropocentrism 
must fundamentally favor humanity over nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are 
nevertheless concerned that such favoritism is “nothing more than the expression of an 
irrational bias” (Taylor 1981:215).  They reason that only a nonanthropocentric ethic can 
guarantee that policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their interests conflict with 
those of nonhumans.  I argue that critics of convergence fail to appreciate that Norton’s 
hypothesis is limited to ideologies that he deems “reasonable” and “suitably broad and 
long-sighted,” or else they misapprehend what these terms imply.  When it comes to 
ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum 
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or 
collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales.  The most unreasonable, narrow, 
and short-sighted ideologies are those that are the most individualistic.  It is at the 
collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place.  I 
defend a version of anthropocentrism that I term ecological anthropocentrism.   
KEYWORDS:  Anthropocentrism, Nonanthropocentrism, Convergence Hypothesis, Bryan 
Norton, Axiom of Future Value, J. Baird Callicott 
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Preface 
The first time that I encountered the term anthropocentrism in a philosophical 
text, it was used pejoratively to indicate an irresponsible set of attitudes and behaviors 
toward the environment and nonhumanity in general.  Of course, this was no mere 
coincidence.  Ever since animal philosophy and environmental philosophy emerged as 
distinct disciplines, their founders have almost universally categorized anthropocentrism 
as a morally reprehensible worldview along the same lines as classism, racism, sexism, 
xenophobia, and the like.  Nonanthropocentrists  claim that, because our intellectual 
traditions have been unwaveringly human-centered, orthodox ethical theories have 
limited ascriptions of moral significance (intrinsic or inherent value) to human beings.  
They argue that as a result, nonhuman aspects of the world have largely been appraised 
only in terms of their instrumental value to humans.  Consequently, 
nonanthropocentrists hold, the anthropocentric, or human-centered, focus of 
traditional ethical frameworks ultimately justifies the exploitation of nonhumanity and 
is thus primarily to blame for enabling the ecological predicament that human societies 
have created.  On the other hand, nonanthropocentrists claim, if nonhuman aspects of 
the world were accorded the sort of intrinsic value recognized in humans, 
anthropogenic ecological degradations would no longer be deemed justifiable. 
Nonanthropocentrists assume that, just as widespread adoption of the anthropocentric 
worldview (that humans or persons are intrinsically valuable) has (allegedly) resulted in 
the abolition of sexism, racism, and so on, the ecologically irresponsible exploitation of 
nature would be overcome by widespread adoption of nonanthropocentrism. 
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After being exposed to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, it struck me that 
so-called nonanthropocentrists do not merely want to ‘save’ nature for its own sake but 
also for the sake of humanity.  According to the convergence hypothesis, if an advocate 
of anthropocentrism “takes the full range of human values—present and future—into 
account, [s/he] will choose a set of policies that can also be accepted by an advocate of 
a consistent and reasonable nonanthropocentrism” (Norton 1997:87).  In other words, 
an anthropocentric environmental ethic is not a contradiction in terms; it is possible to 
justify ecologically responsible policies for strictly human-centered reasons.   
If adding the idea of intrinsic value to that of enlightened human interest 
creates no difference in mandated behaviors, and indicates no real 
changes in behavior from following “broad anthropocentrism,” then. . . 
the “metaphysical” idea that nature has “intrinsic value” is shown to have 
at best only ideological and rhetorical use (Norton 2009:246). 
 
Nonanthropocentrists may be largely ‘preaching to the choir’ since their rhetoric 
most likely appeals to those who already share their intuitions that nonhuman entities 
are valuable in or for themselves.  As Norton argues, due to the severity of the 
ecological predicament and given the fact that politicians and humans at large are more 
easily swayed by human-favoring arguments, it seems much more practical for 
environmentalists to utilize anthropocentrism rather than to reject it.  The dissertation 
that follows is my attempt to demonstrate that an ecological form of anthropocentrism, 
such as that defended by Norton, provides a strong foundation for a rationally 
defensible environmental ethic.  I also aim to demonstrate that advocates of ecological 
anthropocentrism converge with advocates of “consistent and reasonable” 
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nonanthropocentrism on the general sorts of environmental policies they both endorse 
and reject. 
 In Chapter One, I provide a general introduction to the dissertation, discuss some 
basic aspects of the ecological predicament that human societies have created, and 
question whether environmentalists should regret humanity’s existence because of the 
atrocities that human societies have committed against nature.  Since the current 
anthropogenic mass extinction event is among the worst ecological calamities to affect 
Earth’s biosphere over the past 600 million years, it certainly seems that 
environmentalists have cause to experience immense regret.  I adapt an argument 
made by Saul Smilansky to question whether environmentalists, if forced to choose, 
would be willing to ‘restore’ all anthropogenically extirpated species to their ‘natural’ 
state if such a restoration could only be achieved by removing Homo sapiens from 
existence.   I demonstrate that in spite of their sometimes overtly misanthropic rhetoric, 
nonanthropocentrists converge with anthropocentrists in favoring humanity’s existence.  
This demonstration provides support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis and 
establishes the basic thesis that “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists at least implicitly 
subscribe to what Norton calls the Axiom of Future Value.  According to this axiom, a 
world with humans in it is preferable to one in which they are absent, and we have a 
duty therefore to protect our species’ prospects for evolutionary success. 
 In Chapter Two, I provide further support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis 
and address some common arguments leveled against anthropocentrism.  I point out 
that Norton’s critics tend to ignore the fact that his hypothesis only applies to long-
viii 
 
sighted, nonindividualistic, and “reasonable” varieties of anthropocentrism and 
nonanthropocentrism as opposed to varieties that are short-sighted, individualistic, and 
radical.  Nonanthropocentrists’ arguments against anthropocentrism (such for example, 
that it involves questionable ontological and axiological assumptions) simply do not 
apply to the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton.  For, ecological 
anthropocentrists do not assume that humans are the center of the universe or that the 
purpose of nonhumanity’s existence is to satisfy human preferences or interests.  Nor 
do ecological anthropocentrists rely on nonanthropocentrists’ questionable claims 
regarding the practical effects of changing how humans ascribe intrinsic value.  Because 
the widely accepted idea that humans are intrinsically valuable has not universally 
improved humanity’s lot, it seems naïve to assume that broadening ascriptions of 
intrinsic value to include nonhumanity will fix humanity’s ecological predicament.  I also 
question the coherence of a genuinely nonanthropocentric view since if such a view 
were truly free of human-favoring biases, it would not likely lead one to formulate 
priority principles that adjudicate in favor of humans when their interests or preferences 
conflict with those of nonhumans.  I conclude the chapter by arguing that Smilansky’s 
form of regret, coupled with a not-so-ignorant, intertemporal Rawlsian veil, can be used 
to determine what sorts of environmental policies rational persons of possible futures 
would condemn or condone. 
 In Chapter Three, I argue in support of the moral relevance of a geologic 
spatiotemporal scale since such a scale is required to fully appreciate a species’ 
evolutionary success.  I claim that environmentalists’ explicit or implicit adherence to 
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the Axiom of Future Value entails that they must find a geologic scale morally relevant.  
According to this axiom it is the duty of extant humans to do what they can to help 
ensure that our species and its evolutionary successors go on existing indefinitely.  A 
mammalian species such as Homo sapiens should be expected to persist for millions of 
years, yet anatomically modern humans have only been around for a fraction of that 
time.  During humanity’s geologically brief tenure on Earth, humans have managed to 
seriously degrade the resource base that could otherwise have promoted their 
geologically long-term existence.  If humans are to go on existing for the millions of 
years that could be natural for them, current generations must seriously consider the 
long-term effects of their collective actions on our planet’s natural resources and on 
future humans.  Accordingly, I argue that individuals who engage in collective actions 
such as the mass consumption of fossil fuels must recognize their complicity in effecting 
any harms that result.  I also argue by analogy that if we are morally obligated to help 
alleviate the suffering of fellow humans regardless of their spatial proximity to us, as 
Peter Singer and James Rachels insist, we are likewise obligated to do what we can for 
the good of humans regardless of their temporal proximity to us.  I close the chapter 
with a discussion of extinction.  By utilizing a geologic scale, scientists have determined 
that species are disappearing at rates that are exponentially higher than the natural, 
background rate.  Indeed, the current mass extinction event is disturbingly similar to the 
five previous major mass extinction events of the past 600 million years.  I argue that 
while considering extinctions on a geologic scale would lead a holistic rationalist to 
exhibit stoic indifference, those who subscribe to the Axiom of Future Value will instead 
x 
be compelled to reconsider the ecological legacy that is being bestowed on the future 
by collective human actions. 
Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016 
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Chapter One:  Should Environmentalists Regret that Humans Exist? 
1.1 Apocalypse Now? 
Over the past several millennia, human populations have dispersed so widely 
and grown to such an extent that they have come to alter the evolutionary trajectory of 
almost every form of life on the planet.  Although Earth’s biota and ecosystems are 
always evolving, few revisions have been as geologically abrupt or extensive as those 
brought on by the tremendous selection pressures exerted by our species over the past 
50,000 to 70,000 years.  All around the globe, species are disappearing and habitats are 
being altered at rates that are rare even on a billion-year timescale.  Prior to Homo 
sapiens’ diaspora out of Africa and Eurasia, Earth’s most extensive biospheric upheavals 
were mainly due to abiotic factors such as cosmic collisions and prolonged volcanic 
activity.  In the past 600 million years, there have been only five mass extinction events 
that were severe enough to reduce the number of species by half, the last of which 
occurred 65 million years ago.  By studying the geologic record of the late Pleistocene, 
paleontologists have noted that humanity’s sudden range expansion sharply coincides 
with the mass extinction of megafauna in all areas invaded by humans.  Scientists also 
note that the extinction pulse that began in the Pleistocene has continued to accelerate 
in modern times.  In fact, the anthropogenic mass extinction event is now recognized to 
be disturbingly similar to the ‘big five’ of the geologic past. 
Current and projected species extinction rates exceed geologically normal 
background rates by several orders of magnitude, indicating that we face 
an extinction episode equivalent to mass extinctions of the 
paleontological past (Purvis et al. 2000:328). 
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As with past mass extinctions, the impending global crisis has many biotic 
losers being replaced by a few increasingly widespread winners.  Previous 
mass extinctions eliminated over 50% of all species on earth and this 
appears to be the likely outcome of current trends with over 50% of 
species in most groups in decline.  Even if these species (losers) do not 
become completely extinct, they will probably be reduced to tiny 
fragments of undisturbed habitat and become virtually invisible 
components of the biosphere (McKinney and Lockwood 1999:452). 
 
Problems associated with exponential increases in human populations, 
particularly over the past couple of centuries and given humanity’s need to exploit ever 
more habitats in order to obtain the resources required to satisfy unsustainable, 
culturally-ingrained consumption practices, have been exacerbated by both short-
sighted technological applications and the globalization of trade.  Ecologists warn that 
many common practices of human societies are responsible for a host of environmental 
problems, such as global warming, the widespread dispersal of invasive species, 
abnormally high rates of extinction and biotic homogenization, and disruptions to vital 
ecosystem processes.  While most of these problems already pose serious threats to the 
livelihood of current human populations, particularly that of the underprivileged, they 
will only become more acute for future generations.  Needless to say, Earth’s nonhuman 
populations will be even more disproportionately affected in the future by the 
anthropogenic restructuring of our planet’s biotic and abiotic composition.  Indeed, an 
abnormally high rate of extinction will likely continue, and many survivors among the 
species that remain will face increasingly stiff competition for a shrinking resource base.   
Environmental philosophy emerged due to the growing awareness among 
academicians of the ecological predicament, with most representatives labeling 
themselves as nonanthropocentrists.  Nonanthropocentrists mainly distinguish 
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themselves from other philosophers in terms of what aspects of the world they consider 
to have intrinsic value or inherent worth.  As stated by J. Baird Callicott: 
An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, 
confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, 
including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., 
valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which 
may serve human beings.  A non-anthropocentric value theory (or 
axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-
human beings (Callicott 1984:299). 
 
Especially in the subjectivist version that I endorse, the concept of 
intrinsic value of nature, like the concept of human rights, designates less 
a substantive thing than a pragmatic limit on policies driven by aggregate 
utility.  Practically by definition, the adjective 'intrinsic' entails that the 
character or property it modifies exists objectively in the entity to which 
it is attributed.  Indeed, often the adjective 'intrinsic' means that the 
character or property it modifies is the very essence of the entity to 
which it is attributed.  . . .  In environmental philosophy, however, 
'intrinsic value' has also been consistently implicitly defined, via negativa, 
as the antonym of 'instrumental value'.  What value remains – if any does 
– after all something's instrumental value has been accounted for is its 
intrinsic value.  . . .  Thus to value something intrinsically – as we shift 
from the adjectival-objective to the adverbial-subjective form – is to 
value something for itself, as an end-in-itself (to reinvoke the Kantian 
mode of expression), not merely as a means to our own ends, not merely 
as an instrument.  From this perspective, there is no objective property in 
entities to which the noun 'value' corresponds.  Rather we subjects value 
objects in one or both of at least two ways – instrumentally or 
intrinsically – between which there is no middle term (Callicott 2002:16). 
 
Nonanthropocentrists do not always agree about how to confer such value, however.  
Ecocentrists such as Callicott construe the value of larger collectives like species, 
ecosystems, and the biosphere to override the value of individual organisms, whereas 
biocentrists such as Paul Taylor believe that each (wild) living thing has equal inherent 
worth that moral agents have a duty to respect.  Despite such insurmountable 
differences, nonanthropocentrists universally agree with Taylor’s assessment that 
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modernity’s post-Copernican, post-Darwinian revision of humanity’s place in nature 
entails an equally sweeping revision of human values. 
The rejection of the idea of human superiority and, more broadly, of the 
idea that any species is inherently superior (or inferior) to any other, 
entails its positive counterpart:  the principle of species-impartiality.  This 
is the principle that every species counts as having the same value in the 
sense that, regardless of what species a living thing belongs to, it is 
deemed to be prima facie deserving of equal concern and consideration 
on the part of moral agents.  Its good is judged to be worthy of being 
preserved and protected as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity 
whose good it is.  Subscribing to the principle of species-impartiality, we 
now see, means regarding every entity that has a good of its own as 
possessing inherent worth—the same inherent worth, since none is 
superior to another (Taylor 2011:155). 
 
Nonanthropocentrists typically insist that foreseeable ecological dystopias can 
be averted but only if our societies replace their anthropocentric biases with the view 
that nonhumanity’s value is equal to that of humans.  As I explain in Chapter Two, 
nonanthropocentrists argue that anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies make 
problematic assumptions that facilitate the environmental degradations perpetuated by 
our species.  The immediate appeal of their critique is understandable since traditional, 
pre-Darwinian worldviews in the West set up a bifurcation between humans and the 
rest of our planet’s life forms.  Because our species’ most extensive ecological 
degradations—which have mainly occurred since the industrial revolution—have been 
inordinately affected by consumers in societies whose intellectual founders took 
humans to be the measure or measurers of all things, nonanthropocentrists assume that 
ecological degradation is an inevitable side effect of a worldview that puts the interests 
of humans first.  According to Callicott, “The concept of intrinsic value in nature 
functions politically much like the concept of human rights” (Callicott 2002:14).  The 
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presumption is that if humans and nonhumans were recognized to be members of the 
same moral community, environmental policies would equally acknowledge and protect 
their rights to exist.  Consequently, speciesism, anthropogenic mass extinction, habitat 
loss, and the like would come to an end—just as tribalism, nationalism, racism, and 
sexism have (allegedly) been overcome.  I argue in Chapter Two that 
nonanthropocentrists such as Callicott seem to have unrealistic expectations regarding 
the practical effects of more widespread attributions of intrinsic value.  If the 
anthropocentric assumption that humans are intrinsically valuable has indeed been 
accepted by most people, this has failed to produce an equally widespread adoption of 
policies that universally protect human rights.  Massive inequalities between the poor 
and the wealthy, as well as various forms of discrimination, continue to exist within and 
among human societies regardless of the presumption that within many of these 
societies humans are considered to have intrinsic value.  Since the intrinsic-value-of-
humanity arguments expressed by legions of moral philosophers over the past couple of 
centuries have not yet achieved such philosophers’ desired results, we should not be so 
optimistic concerning the desired outcome of the intrinsic-value-of-nonhumanity 
arguments of nonanthropocentrists even if they are expressed over a similar expanse of 
time.  Indeed, many environmentalists claim that human societies are running out of 
time.  According to Craig Dilworth: 
It is most unlikely that any of the radical changes to society and the 
economy proposed by environmentalists – especially changes in 
philosophies and worldviews – will be adopted in time.  Consequently 
human civilisation – primarily Western techno-industrial urban society – 
will self-destruct, producing massive environmental damage, social chaos 
and megadeath (Dilworth 2010:453—454). 
6 
 
 
In spite of such pessimism, Bryan Norton argues that since anthropocentrism has the 
upper hand in influencing policy decisions, it would be more reasonable and effective 
for environmentalists to use anthropocentric arguments to convince politicians to adopt 
environmentally sound policies that will benefit humans and nonhumans alike. 
To those who are uncommitted to environmentalism (and this includes 
many important decision makers), appeals to intrinsic values in nature 
and to rights of nonhumans appear “soft,” “subjective,” and “speculative.”  
We can accept this fact of political life without agreeing with it.  
Whatever the answer to the intellectual question of whether nonhuman 
species have intrinsic value, . . . human-oriented reasons carry more 
weight in current policy debates.  Given the urgency of environmental 
degradation and the irreversibility of losses in biodiversity, it would be 
equivalent to fiddling while Rome burns to delay action until the 
achievement of a positive social consensus attributing rights and intrinsic 
value to nonhuman species (Norton 2004:470). 
 
Furthermore, Norton claims, nonanthropocentrists need not demand that adequate 
environmental policies recognize intrinsic values in nature since the full range of values 
expressed by humans is much more pluralistic. 
The question is not one of determining which objects ‘have’ some reified 
type of value, but rather to determine whether good reasons can be 
given for invoking a particular value in a particular situation.  This line of 
reasoning apparently opens up the possibility of reconciling the two sides 
in the debate over ‘intrinsic’ versus ‘instrumental’ value in nature – it is 
possible to include both instrumental and noninstrumental reasons for 
preferring one set of policies to another, without asserting that ‘intrinsic’ 
value exists independently of human, valuing actions.  If we reject this 
sharp dichotomy between instrumental and intrinsic values and the 
associated classification of natural objects as instruments or as moral 
beings, a pluralist and integrative position emerges as a possibility:  there 
are many ways in which humans value nature and these ways range 
along a continuum from entirely self-directed and consumptive uses, and 
include also human spiritual values and aesthetic values, and also 
noninstrumental valuations.  If one forgoes a sharp, definitional 
distinction between these two, opposed types of valuing, the moral task 
of sorting entities into those that have, and those that lack, this special 
7 
feature of ‘noninstrumental’ value becomes a nonproblem (Norton 
2000:1038). 
1.2 Are Human-Centered Worldviews Really to Blame for Our Ecological 
Predicament? 
Contrary to the claims of nonanthropocentrists, a handful of environmental 
philosophers argue that our ecological predicament cannot be attributed to 
anthropocentrism itself but instead to a “limited and short-term vision of what 
constitutes human well-being” (Grey 1993:468).  According to Bryan Norton’s 
convergence hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate 
policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as 
a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11).  
Environmentalists who endorse a variety of values will nevertheless tend 
to see environmental problems in a similar way and will pursue common-
denominator goals, even though they might explain and justify those 
goals in quite different evaluative language, because the larger context of 
environmental management—the context in which all values are 
pursued—will be understood as the larger ecological context. 
Environmentalists have been able to fashion a working consensus for 
addressing environmental problems on an ecological basis precisely 
because they understand the world as the context of multiple values. 
This understanding unites them behind goals essential to protect a wide 
variety of values, however expressed, but the impetus toward the 
consensus is scientific.  Environmentalists are being driven together by 
their commitment to ecological contextualism, which implies that all 
human values depend upon a healthy context (Norton 1991:197). 
Norton and other ecological anthropocentrists claim that currently foreseeable 
ecological dystopias can be averted with the adoption of a form of anthropocentrism 
that is worthy of rational support.  In their eyes, it is not the case that we have been too 
human-centered but instead, that we have not been human-centered enough.  
Nonanthropocentrists who reject Norton’s convergence hypothesis, they insist, must 
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provide an adequate response to the following question:  Assuming that 
anthropocentrism is an ideology that favors satisfying the interests, preferences, and 
values of collective humanity and not merely those of individual humans, why have 
societies under its sway permitted policies that are foreseeably detrimental to the long-
term satisfaction of basic and vital human interests, preferences, and values?  After all, 
those who directly benefit from ecological irresponsibility and degradation tend to 
represent a very small portion of humanity.  Unless anthropocentrism is necessarily 
equated with a form of egoism that condones policies favoring satisfaction of the short-
term interests, preferences, and values of the few at the expense of the long-term 
interests, preferences, and values of the many, it is problematic to conclude that a 
human-centered worldview is inherently devastating to the environment.  As Tim 
Hayward points out: 
Proposals for the ‘rejection’ of anthropocentrism are unhelpful because 
they cloud the real problem they think to address.  The problem has to do 
with a lack of concern with nonhumans but the term anthropocentrism 
can all too plausibly be understood as meaning an excessive concern with 
humans.  The latter, however, is not the problem at all.  On the contrary, 
a cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a 
lamentable lack of interest in the wellbeing of other humans.  Moreover, 
even when it is not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but 
other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to 
suggest that those doing the harm are being ‘human-centred’.  To see 
this, one only has to consider some typical practices which are 
appropriately criticised.  . . .  In the case of hunting a species to extinction, 
this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as ‘anthropocentrism’ since it 
typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by 
(probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as 
serving human interests in general, but the interests of one quite 
narrowly-defined group, such as poachers or whalers.  A similar point can 
be made regarding the destruction of the forest – for those who derive 
economic benefit from the destruction oppose not only the human 
interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed, 
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but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such 
forests produce (Hayward 1997:57—58).   
 
If human-centered worldviews are to blame for humanity’s ecological 
predicament, they must differ significantly from the “sufficiently broad and long-sighted” 
anthropocentrism to which Norton’s convergence hypothesis applies.  Accordingly, 
nonanthropocentrists should focus their critiques on those particular human-favoring 
worldviews that can be legitimately blamed for humanity’s detrimental impacts on our 
planet’s biosphere.  It is not anthropocentrism as such that must be rejected but its 
problematic forms, in particular, those that are egoistic or otherwise narrowly focused 
on individuals and on the limited scales of space and time that are meaningful to 
individuals.  Nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum 
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or 
collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales.  As Norton explains: 
Theoreticians differ wildly in what intrinsic value is, what it means to 
have it, and what entities in fact have it.  Similarly, anthropocentrists 
differ regarding how far into the future our obligations to future people 
extend.  So there are really several “families” of both anthropocentric 
and nonanthropocentric theories of environmental value (Norton 
2009:239).   
 
The ideologies that Norton would construe to be the most unreasonable, narrow, and 
short-sighted are typically those that are also the most individualistic, such as Taylor’s 
egalitarian biocentrism.  Coincidentally, defenders of “reasonably interpreted” forms of 
nonanthropocentrism, such as Callicott, reject highly individualistic forms of 
nonanthropocentrism for similar reasons.  As I will demonstrate later, it is at the 
collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place.   
10 
1.3 Regarding Smilanskian Regret – Should We Be Sorry that We Exist? 
One of the distinguishing features of environmental ethics is an expansion of the 
spatiotemporal limits of current humans’ moral obligations to fellow humans and other 
entities.  Whether they are anthropocentrists or nonanthropocentrists, environmental 
philosophers typically insist that we have stronger moral obligations to protect the 
interests, preferences, or values of Earth’s future life forms than are called for by 
traditional ethical frameworks.  As Norton states it, “Standard contemporary ethical 
theories, at least in the United States and Western Europe are essentially 
individualistic.  . . .  The behavioral prohibitions embodied in them derive from the 
principle that actions ought not to harm other individuals unjustifiably” (Norton 
1984:139).  Because of their individualistic focus, traditional ethics do not require agents 
to consider the effects of their actions beyond spatiotemporal scales that are 
meaningful to individuals.  Norton argues that an adequate environmental ethic must be 
both long-sighted and nonindividualistic.  According to Norton, the central task of such 
an ethic is to indefinitely protect Earth’s natural resources. 
Concern for the continued flow of resources insures that sources of 
goods and services such as ecosystems, soil, forests, etc. remain 
"healthy" and are not deteriorating.  In this way, options are held open 
and reasonable needs of individuals for whatever goods and services can 
be fulfilled with reasonable labor, technology, and ingenuity.  The 
emphasis of this concern, however, is not individualistic since it is not 
focused on the fulfillment of specifiable needs, but rather on the integrity 
and health of ongoing ecosystems as holistic entities (ibid.:144). 
Creating a sustainable society, including democratic institutions to 
control resource use and implementing conservation policies requires a 
multigenerational temporal horizon of perception and evaluation.  These 
are the communal values that are relevant to assessing whether a society 
can survive in a specific place for many generations; and these are the 
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values that are relevant to intergenerational comparisons and judgments 
of intergenerational equity (Norton 2000:38). 
 
Meanwhile, Saul Smilansky has recently called into question commonly accepted 
intuitions regarding intergenerational equity and our moral obligations to entities of the 
past, specifically, to humans of the past who were victims of massive atrocities.  
Although Smilansky’s purely anthropocentric argument is not aimed at 
environmentalists, it can be reframed to address their concerns about humanity’s 
impact on the environment and to highlight the depth or shallowness of their 
nonanthropocentrism.  As I argue in Chapter Two, Smilansky’s ideas can serve as a 
useful tool for determining which current or proposed environmental policies ecological 
anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists of the indefinite future would 
agree upon endorsing or rejecting.  In this chapter, I adapt Smilansky’s argument to 
demonstrate that despite the misanthropic rhetoric of nonanthropocentrists that nature 
would be better off without humans, the nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists 
identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis indeed converge in being equally 
tolerant of our species’ continued existence.  Before applying Smilansky’s argument to 
environmentalists’ concerns, however, I will present it in its original form. 
Smilansky highlights the lamentable fact that humans throughout history have all 
too often committed horrific acts of violence against one another.  According to 
Smilansky, virtually all humans who exist today, indeed anyone who has ever existed, 
should morally prefer not to have been born.  Assuming that most people lead relatively 
innocuous lives, Smilansky claims that such widespread existential regret should not be 
experienced because of what people have done but because of the enormous atrocities 
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committed against humanity—such as the Holocaust and the practice of slavery—that 
were causally necessary for them to have been born.  Derek Parfit (1984) notes that 
since even very slight changes in the timing of someone’s conception can result in 
entirely distinct arrays of genetic material coming together, any major alterations to 
human history would have resulted in the existence of a radically distinct set of 
individuals in the present.  It so happens, however, that if, going back millennia, 
historical atrocities like the Holocaust and the enslavement of African peoples had not 
occurred, the causal chains which led to the existence of virtually all extant humans 
would have been broken.  Since occurrences like the mass murder, rape, torture, 
enslavement, and genocide of innocent humans are inherently bad, anthropocentrists 
must prefer a world in which such things did not take place.  According to Smilansky, 
consequently, if we truly regret historical atrocities and sincerely wish they had never 
occurred, then we whose existence depends on the occurrence of these atrocities must 
also implicitly wish that we had never been born, despite paradoxically preferring to 
exist.   
Smilansky claims that this point will be clarified if we ask the following question:  
“If it were within one’s power, would one choose to prevent the relevant state of 
affairs?  This is clearly an important sense of being sorry” (Smilansky 2013:656—657).  In 
other words, if given the chance to actually right terrible past wrongs causally 
connected to one’s existence, one would be willing to do so even if it precluded one’s 
existence.  Smilansky explains: 
Given that we could not realistically expect to exist without the calamities 
of history like the Holocaust, we cannot merely say that we prefer for the 
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Holocaust not to have existed, but without being willing to acknowledge 
that this implies that we would then not have come to exist.  Either one 
does not really prefer this, all considered, namely, is not willing to ‘pay 
the price of non-existence’, or one does prefer not to have existed, all 
considered, and regrets one’s existence in this sense.  . . .  On the direct 
normative level, when we want to ask our question about what we would 
prefer if we have to choose, we need to assume that matters stand in an 
‘either-or’ relationship:  either the calamities of the past are avoided, but 
then we do not come to exist, or we do exist, but then the calamities of 
the past—which, realistically, are necessary for our coming to be born—
are to remain (ibid.:657, emphasis added). 
 
We can imagine ourselves looking back at someone placed on the verge 
of a great historical calamity, and being offered the option of pressing a 
button to stop it (at the expense of particular potential people, including 
ourselves).  There is something hideous about wishing this person not to 
press the button, when we know that something like the Holocaust could, 
but would thereby not, be prevented.  But wishing that that button 
would be pressed is equivalent to being sorry that we exist, in the 
relevant sense (ibid.:665). 
 
Of course, one could claim that Smilansky’s concern is irrelevant since it is not 
possible for us to prevent bad past events from happening.  According to this 
consequentialist claim, our moral responsibilities extend only to those entities within 
the causal reach of our actions, which are only efficacious in the present or future.  So, if 
the only morally relevant actions are those that produce effects, we are blameless for 
shrugging our shoulders about human history prior to our existence.  We should, 
therefore, regret our actions or existence only if they have significantly negative effects 
on entities in the present or future.  Smilansky claims that the consequentialist 
objection to his form of regret is indecisive for at least a couple of reasons. 
First, my claim would be interesting even if it applied only to non-
consequentialists.  Second, it seems implausible to view human attitudes 
and emotions as so closely dependent on future relevance, whatever 
one’s position:  surely a consequentialist who has lost his best friend to 
cancer would be struck by grief, and may well regret things that he did or 
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did not do for his friend, while that friend was still alive, even if now 
there is ‘no point’ in such regret.  It would be similarly implausible to say 
that consequentialists ought not to regret the great evils of the past, 
which is all that I require in order to get my argument going (ibid.:658—
659). 
 
One may concede this point to Smilansky and still claim that his argument is vacuous.  
After all, if we focus on all of the (significantly) morally blameworthy behavior in 
humanity’s past that was causally required for our existence, there will be no end to our 
regrets.  Human history is filled with considerable morally reprehensible behavior.  Even 
if we ‘corrected’ the wrongs of one atrocity such as the Holocaust, the beings whose 
harms would thereby be averted would nevertheless have their own reasons for 
preferring nonexistence.  For their births, like ours, were causally linked to atrocities of 
the past and were thus equally regrettable.  So, unless there existed a utopian, Garden-
of-Eden beginning to human history, there is no point at which anyone who has ever 
existed should be free of Smilanskian regret.  If we were faced with the opportunity to 
‘correct’ all of “the calamities of history,” it seems that we would in fact be morally 
obligated to prevent humans from existing in the first place.   Smilansky’s response to 
this argument is that his thought experiment is only meant to test our moral intuitions 
regarding specific atrocities of the past. 
My argument does not, however, depend on a strong claim such as that 
only the best possible world is morally acceptable.  It suffices that we 
recognize that some major instances of evil and suffering could have 
been prevented, without making other things worse, overall—but that 
this better alternative world would not have included us.  We make a 
pairwise comparison between a situation where an event like the 
Holocaust occurs, and a situation where it does not because, for example, 
Hitler is assassinated.  Morally, we ought to regret that such an 
alternative was not the one actualized (ibid.:661). 
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One could still agree with Smilansky that it is regrettable that specific atrocities 
like the Holocaust occurred but disagree that one should in principle be willing to 
sacrifice oneself in order to correct such wrongs.  Even if we have the right to sacrifice 
ourselves to prevent enormous calamities from taking place, this right does not permit 
us to sacrifice the billions of fellow humans who would also be expunged from existence 
by our actions.  One’s noble hypothetical act of suicide might turn out to be the largest 
atrocity ever committed against humanity.  Since almost all of those who currently exist 
would consider their lives worth living and would thus prefer to have been born, to 
render such beings nonexistent would surely be to commit a tremendous harm against 
them.  Smilansky considers this objection as well. 
Perhaps our perspective, as numerous already-existing, actual persons, 
enables us to block the demand to acquiesce in our paying the price of 
the undoing of the evils of the past.  After all, even after acknowledging 
the distinction between being murdered and merely not being born, now 
that we are alive, ‘rolling back’ history at our expense, for the sake of 
saving the victims of historical catastrophes, seems equivalent—for us—
to our murder:  now we exist, and in opting for our not having come to 
exist, we cease to exist (ibid.:662—663). 
 
Nevertheless, Smilansky claims that this objection fails since none of us who would be 
expunged from existence would ever have been born, so “there would never have been 
anyone for whom that could be bad” (ibid.:663).  At the same time, it was undeniably 
bad for the victims of past atrocities to have been severely wronged.  According to the 
person-affecting perspective (Parfit 1984), only actual, identifiable persons can be 
harmed in a morally relevant sense.  Smilansky, however, argues that the person-
affecting perspective (that we are only morally obligated to protect the existential rights 
of persons who actually exist) cannot be used to reject his proposal because if atrocities 
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of the past had been averted, we who exist today would merely have been potential 
persons.1  If we have to choose, Smilansky claims, our moral obligations to prevent the 
occurrence of major wrongs to actual persons of the past should outweigh our moral 
obligations to protect the existential rights of actual persons of the present.   
The prevention of the great evils of history, even if it would have been at 
our expense, must be morally good, overall.  The enormity of physical 
suffering and emotional torment involved is such that one cannot resist 
the idea that it would have been preferable had history taken a better 
course, albeit at our expense.  The idea that all of this avoidable historical 
awfulness may be accepted, because it leads to our existence, is a 
reductio of the person-affecting perspective, in this context.  With these 
sorts of stakes, the impersonal perspective triumphs.  And from the 
impersonal perspective, the possibility of our not coming (en masse) into 
existence is not morally equivalent to our ‘mass murder’.  Major evils are 
prevented, and impersonally there is no significant price:  it is merely that 
a different set of people is born (ibid.:663). 
 
Even if anthropocentrists concede this controversial point to Smilansky, one last 
objection to the morally obligatory nature of Smilanskian regret may be decisive.  
Although it certainly would have been preferable for victims of historical atrocities like 
the Holocaust to have been spared their harms, ‘correcting’ such atrocities would not 
prevent future ones from taking place.  Since occasional displays of horrific, interspecific 
violence occur all too commonly among humans, it seems plausible that the best we 
could hope for in ‘correcting’ history would be to exchange past atrocities for future 
ones.  However, if that is the case, it does not seem rational to argue that we should be 
morally required to sacrifice ourselves to bring about such a state of affairs.  Regardless 
                                                          
1 Personalists such as Alberto Giubilini (2012) would insist that we would instead be rendered merely 
possible persons.  The theoretical distinction is briefly discussed in Chapter Two.  It should also be noted 
that nonanthropocentrists as well as ecological anthropocentrists reject the person-affecting perspective 
for reasons that are pointed out in Chapters Two and Three. 
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of whether we reject Smilansky’s conclusion, however, his thought experiment remains 
insightful and can be applied to the ethical concerns expressed by environmental 
philosophers.  Also, as Smilansky notes, “Clearly people can be led, by the realization of 
the dependence of their existence on the evils of the past, to a stronger determination 
to improve the future” (ibid.:659).  Although anthropocentrists may reject the idea that 
we should be morally obligated to sacrifice ourselves to ‘correct’ major atrocities of the 
past, they may nevertheless accept the idea that future, merely possible people should 
be willing to ‘sacrifice’ their existence in order to correct the wrongs that we commit in 
the present.  Accordingly, a different set of future humans with less Smilanskian regret 
would come into being. 
1.4 Smilanskian Regret Meets Environmental Philosophy 
From the perspective of environmentalists, one of the greatest evils of the past 
(as well as of the present) is the anthropogenic mass extinction of Earth’s nonhuman 
species.  I argue in Chapter Three that this is one of the most salient reasons that a 
geologic scale is morally relevant.  According to paleontologists following Paul Martin 
(1967), the most likely cause of the late Pleistocene mass extinction of Earth’s 
megafauna was the human practice of overkill.  Ever since our species began its 
diaspora out of Africa and Eurasia around 50,000 to 70,000 years ago, its invasion into 
novel habitats has been highly correlated with the mass extinction of our planet’s 
nonhuman species.  From an environmental philosopher’s perspective, these are surely 
calamities that ought not to have taken place and therefore provide plausible reasons 
for experiencing regret about what our species has done to nonhuman nature. 
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If we do not look back to the late Quaternary, we underestimate the rate 
of extinction during the presence of humans on the planet.  This is no 
problem for normal or background extinctions, which sputter along like 
the decay of isotopes.  Theoretically, background extinction is roughly in 
balance with the evolution of new taxa. But extinctions in near time far 
exceed background extinctions.  Ignoring, for example, the disappearance 
around 13,000 years ago of the horses, mammoths, and mastodons that 
had been native to North America for tens of millions of years seriously 
affects any estimate of the rate of environmental degradation during our 
tenure on the planet (Martin 2005:55). 
 
Of course, the pulse of extinctions that began with early humans has continued to 
accelerate exponentially as the environmental side effects of human societies have 
infiltrated almost every conceivable niche of the biosphere. 
What is currently taking place is a gigantic process of destruction 
comparable only to the great climatic and cosmic catastrophes that mark 
the history of life on earth.  Due to the irreversible quality of this process, 
many ecologists consider this “quiet process of death” (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich 1981) to be all together one of the most serious and disturbing 
symptoms of the ecological crisis (Gorke 2003:205). 
 
Bringing to bear Smilanskian regret, shouldn’t environmental philosophers—at least 
those who label themselves nonanthropocentrists—be sorry that Homo sapiens ever 
evolved?  In other words, from the moral perspective of such environmentalists, 
wouldn’t the Earth be a much better place if humans had never existed?  Frederick Ferré 
suggests that the nonanthropocentric perspective may compel one to be “ashamed for 
the human race, regretting as demonic our presence on the earth” (Ferré 1994:61).  If 
Homo sapiens had never existed, the anthropogenic mass extinction event would never 
have taken place.  Indeed, none of the many ecological degradations associated with 
our species would have occurred.  Given that the raison d'être of environmental 
philosophy is deep concern about such degradations, it seems that they should certainly 
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experience a great deal of Smilanskian regret regarding not only their own existence but 
that of Homo sapiens at large. 
 In order to test the moral implications of environmentalists’ confrontation with 
Smilanskian regret, I suggest the following thought experiment.  Let us imagine that a 
pathologically curious, pandimensional being (hereafter referred to as Pandi) is 
fascinated by Smilansky’s argument and is keen to determine if any environmental 
philosophers would be willing to atone for humanity’s sins against nature by expunging 
Homo sapiens from existence.  As Smilansky points out, nonanthropocentrists need not 
insist on instantiating the best possible world, which would presumably be one free of 
suffering—particularly since such a world is hardly conceivable in the light of what we 
know about natural selection.  However, a world free of the “cancerous growth” 
(Rolston 1996:259) of humanity would be devoid of a great number of massive atrocities 
that have befallen nonhumanity.  Since humans have committed an inordinately huge 
number of atrocities against nonhumans, however, Pandi has decided to focus 
specifically on the atrocity of extinction.  Pandi has placed before us two enormous, 
pandimensional chambers, each of which has been rigged to exterminate whatever is 
inside at the push of a button.  In the first chamber are all the members of every species 
that have ever been extirpated by humans, along with all of the members of the species 
that are currently facing extinction.  We find ourselves transported into the second 
chamber, along with every human who has ever existed, and every primate ancestor 
going back to the Miocene.  Pandi informs an environmental philosopher that s/he must 
choose which beings within the two chambers will be expunged from existence.  If s/he 
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exhibits genuine Smilanskian regret for humanity’s sins, s/he will push the button that 
represents the second chamber, Homo sapiens will never have evolved, and all of the 
species that became extinct as a result of humanity will be ‘restored’ to face natural, 
nonhuman selection pressures.  If the environmental philosopher does not genuinely 
regret the existence of Homo sapiens, s/he will push the button that represents the first 
chamber.  As a result, nothing will have changed.  All of the species that were 
anthropogenically extinguished will remain extinct, and those species that are highly 
endangered will continue to face imminent extinction.  In hopes of forcing compliance, 
Pandi informs the philosopher that if s/he is not willing to choose, the beings within 
both chambers will be exterminated. 
We will begin by considering the likely response of an anthropocentrist like 
Bryan Norton and then consider the likely responses of a few nonanthropocentrists.  
Because Norton, like any other ecological anthropocentrist, subscribes to the Axiom of 
Future Value (referred to as the AFV throughout the dissertation), his response is fairly 
straightforward.  He would not likely be willing to cause the extinction of Homo sapiens 
at any cost.  According to the AFV: 
The perpetuation of the human species is a good thing because a 
universe containing human consciousness is preferable to one without it.  
This value claim implies that current generations must show concern for 
future generations.  They must take steps to avoid the extinction of the 
species and they must provide a reasonably stable resource base so that 
future generations will not suffer great deprivation (Norton 1984:143). 
 
According to my definition, anyone other than an egoist who qualifies as 
anthropocentric would choose to save humanity in this scenario.  Since an egoist may 
have his or her own inscrutable, self-serving reasons for choosing to expunge humanity 
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from existence, egoists are fundamentally unpredictable.  In all other cases, an 
anthropocentrist is someone who exhibits a human-favoring bias such that s/he would 
prefer that humans exist even if human existence is inherently ecologically devastating 
for a host of nonhuman species. 
 So which option would a nonanthropocentrist choose in Pandi’s Chamber of 
Death?  Pandi is keen to discover ecocentrist Holmes Rolston’s response, since he 
declares that “a species ought not to be sacrificed on the altar of human mistakes, 
regardless of what persons made mistakes where in the complex chains of events” 
(Rolston 1998:350).  As discussed in Chapter Three, since Rolston argues that humans 
who have exceeded their land’s carrying capacity are essentially cells of “cancerous 
growth,” and since ecologists now widely claim that humans have overshot the planet’s 
carrying capacity, perhaps he would be willing to atone for humanity’s sins.  However, 
regarding mass extinctions of the geologic past, Rolston claims: 
We first think that the catastrophic extinctions were quite a bad thing, an 
unlucky disaster.  But in fact they were good luck.  Indeed, were it not for 
such extinctions we humans would not be here, nor would any of the 
mammalian complexity.  . . .  We should think twice before judging these 
catastrophic extinctions to be a bad thing (Rolston 1994:48). 
 
Since Rolston accepts mass extinctions of the geologic past because they ultimately led 
to the existence of Homo sapiens, it is not likely that he would be willing to sacrifice 
humanity’s existence in this scenario.  Past mass extinctions such as the end-Permian 
event caused by “asteroid impact or volcanism” (Benton and Twitchett 2003:359) were 
several orders of magnitude greater than the current, anthropogenic one.  
Paleontologists Michael Benton and Richard Twitchett explain: 
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Life came close to complete annihilation 251 Mya.  A fortunate 5% of 
species did, however, survive and understanding how these few taxa 
recovered from the severest of evolutionary bottlenecks is crucial to 
understanding the subsequent evolution of the biosphere.  It took 100 
My for global biodiversity at the family level to return to pre-extinction 
levels (ibid.:362). 
 
If Rolston has no regrets about such a tremendous loss of nonhuman species for 
ultimately human-favoring reasons, he would certainly not experience Smilanskian 
regret for the comparative handful of species extirpated by humans since such regret 
would morally require him to choose to prevent humans from ever existing.   
Perhaps Pandi can solicit a more nonanthropocentric response from Callicott.  
After all, Callicott has criticized the sort of response offered by Rolston for exhibiting the 
stoic indifference of a holistic rationalist regarding past mass extinctions. 
A holistic rationalist could not regret the massive die-off of the late 
Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammal-populated 
world (Callicott 1989:142). 
 
From the classical rationalistic axiological perspective, the system itself, 
classically the cosmos and its various microcosmic sub-systems, often 
including human society, was considered valuable per se or at least to 
exemplify or instantiate "the Good."  In its present adaptation to non-
anthropocentric environmental ethics, rational holism would consider the 
biosphere as a whole and its several sub-systems, biomes, biocoenoses, 
and micro-ecosystems, species, and their populations to be valuable 
(Callicott 1984:303). 
 
One may morally decry the very real and imminent prospect of an abrupt, 
massive reduction of biotic diversity to be succeeded by a "mono-
culture" consisting of tens of billions of human beings, their habitations, 
their economic cultivars (and the pests thereof), human transportation, 
distribution, and communication networks, and little else.  However, if 
one forthrightly and articulately defends one's considered intuition that 
this process of anthropogenic biological impoverishment is objectively 
morally wrong by positing organic "richness" (biotic diversity, complexity, 
and harmony) as objectively and impersonally good, one might well be 
accused of temporal parochialism.  Considering our time as but an 
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infinitesimal moment in the three and one-half billion year tenure of life 
on planet Earth, the present tendency of man to extirpate and eventually 
extinguish other species and take over their habitats for himself and his 
domesticated symbionts might be viewed quite disinterestedly as but a 
brief transitional stage in the Earth's evolutionary Odyssey (Callicott 
1984:303—304). 
 
However, Callicott’s reason for criticizing holistic rationalism is that a consistent holistic 
rationalist, unlike Rolston, would likewise be disinterested in the extinction of humanity.  
Callicott is aware that if humans were to destroy most of the ‘complex’ life forms on 
Earth, including themselves, they would eventually be replaced by other living things 
that a nonanthropocentrist who embraces holistic rationalism could value no less than 
Earth’s current biota. 
The deeply felt and widely shared moral intuition that extant non-human 
species and the biosphere in its current state have intrinsic value, 
therefore, does not seem adequately articulated by holistic rationalism.  
There is something valuable, it seems intuitively certain, about our world 
(with us in it!) which nevertheless resists reduction to our interests or to 
our tastes.  For its articulation and explanation this intuition, if it is to 
withstand critical examination, will require a moral theory that is at once 
humanistic, but not anthropocentric (ibid.:304). 
 
Callicott would therefore reject Pandi’s offer to atone for humanity’s sins as well.  
Although Callicott openly professes his humanism, he believes that this does not make 
him an anthropocentrist.  Callicott defines an anthropocentrist as someone who can 
only value nonhumanity instrumentally but allows a humanist to value it intrinsically.  
According to my definition, however, a humanist is simply a type of anthropocentrist.  
According to simple humanism, all human beings, regardless of whether they lack 
person-imbuing traits or are useful to fellow humans, are to be treated as members of 
the moral community—that is, they have strong rights to exist.  Personalists, on the 
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other hand, are anthropocentrists who only grant strong existential rights to entities 
that display traits of personhood—that is, they subscribe to the person-affecting 
perspective.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Callicott formulates priority principles that 
adjudicate in favor of humans whenever their existence is at stake.  Callicott argues that 
“the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic community (to preserve its integrity, 
stability, and beauty) do not cancel or replace the duties attendant on membership in 
the human global village (to respect human rights)” (Callicott 1999:71—72). 
Let us finally consider how an egalitarian biocentrist such as Taylor would 
respond to Pandi’s dilemma.  According to Taylor’s ethics of respect for nature, all (wild) 
living things are equally valuable and equally deserving of respect.  Knowing this, Pandi 
hands him a coin to toss in case it will help him decide.  However, since Taylor 
subscribes to the principle of species impartiality, perhaps he would give greater weight 
to the sheer number of nonhuman species that could be saved from Pandi’s Chamber of 
Death.   
Our duties toward the Earth’s nonhuman forms of life are grounded on 
their status as entities possessing inherent worth.  They have a kind of 
value that belongs to them by their very nature, and it is this value that 
makes it wrong to treat them as if they existed as mere means to human 
ends.  It is for their sake that their good should be promoted or protected.  
Just as humans should be treated with respect, so should they (Taylor 
2011:13). 
 
Each being has inherent worth as an individual and must accordingly be 
treated with respect, regardless of what species it belongs to.  . . .  To 
harm several such beings . . . is to commit a number of violations of duty, 
corresponding to the number of creatures harmed (ibid.:284). 
 
Since the number of anthropogenically extirpated individuals in the first chamber 
outnumbers the humans, hominids, and primates in the second chamber, Taylor would 
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seemingly be duty-bound to exhibit the Smilanskian regret Pandi is anticipating.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter Two, like Callicott and other nonanthropocentrists, 
Taylor formulates priority principles that adjudicate in favor of humanity when it comes 
down to an us-or-them scenario.  Regarding his principle of self-defense, Taylor 
explains: 
When we have a firm sense of our own worth we place intrinsic value on 
our existence as persons.  Out of self-respect we judge our personhood 
to be something worthy of being preserved.  At the same time we believe 
that we are not inferior in worth to animals or plants.  Now if we were to 
refrain from defending ourselves against them and so allow them to kill 
us, we would be sacrificing our very existence to them.  To require such a 
sacrifice as a moral duty could only be justified on the ground that they 
have greater inherent worth than we do.  Assuming that we have no 
good reasons for accepting that ground, we may conclude that there is 
no validly binding duty on our part to sacrifice ourselves to them.  It is 
therefore morally permissible for us to defend ourselves against them, 
even though they are equal to us in inherent worth (ibid.:268). 
 
Although it may be argued that Taylor’s principle of self-defense does not apply in 
Pandi’s Chamber of Death since nonhumans are not acting aggressively against humans, 
Smilansky’s form of regret does require us to be willing to sacrifice ourselves “as a moral 
duty.”  It seems that one could thus interpret Taylor as implying that he would choose to 
‘defend’ Homo sapiens from nonexistence in this scenario.  Perhaps one could also take 
the straightforward defense of human-favoritism expressed by Taylor’s follower, James 
Sterba, as a confirmation of this assumption. 
Actions that are necessary for meeting one’s basic needs or the basic 
needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require 
aggressing against the basic needs of animals and plants (Sterba 2001:22). 
 
In addition, if we were to prefer consistently the basic needs of the 
members of other species whenever those needs conflicted with our own 
(or even if we do so half the time), . . . we would soon be facing 
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extinction, and, fortunately, we have no reason to think that we are 
morally required to bring about our own extinction (Sterba 1994:232). 
 
At this point, perhaps Pandi is thinking, “With nonanthropocentrists like these, 
who needs anthropocentrists?”  As far as I am aware, there is no environmental 
philosopher, anthropocentrist or nonanthropocentrist, who would willingly sacrifice 
Homo sapiens in order to ‘restore’ all anthropogenically extirpated or endangered 
species to their ‘natural’ state.  Only a nonanthropocentrist who genuinely lacks any 
human-favoring bias would bite the bullet and correct the sins of humanity.  But no such 
creatures seem to exist.  Moreover, such a nonanthropocentrist would not be deemed 
“reasonable” by Norton or by any of the so-called nonanthropocentrists whose 
responses we have just considered.   
So what should this exercise in Smilanskian regret teach us?  In support of 
Norton’s convergence hypothesis, there is a very significant amount of agreement 
among anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists concerning the extent of their 
human-favoritism.  Human-favoritism, like nonhuman-favoritism, runs along a 
continuum as to whether it is more individualist or collectivist in character.  It is at the 
collective end of the continuum, where, not individual humans, but the entire species 
Homo sapiens and its ecological requirements are appropriately valued, that the 
convergence takes place.   
If we were to retread the Pandi though experiment and place individual 
nonhumans in one chamber and individual humans in the other, there would be less 
convergence.  For example, if an endangered black rhinoceros were in the first chamber 
and a poverty-stricken Zimbabwean who has exceeded his or her land’s carrying 
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capacity were in the second, Holmes Rolston would clearly save the rhinoceros, whereas 
all of the other environmental philosophers discussed in the above scenario would save 
the human.   
Given the fact that rhinos have been so precipitously reduced, given that 
the Zimbabwean population is escalating (the average married woman 
there desires to have six children), one ought to put the black rhino as a 
species first, even if this costs human lives (Rolston 1996:262). 
 
If we were to place various individual nonhumans in both chambers, we should also 
expect instances of divergence.  For example, Rolston, Callicott, and Norton would all 
save an individual from an endangered species if it were paired with an individual from a 
heavily populated species, but Taylor would find such a consideration irrelevant.  
Because of egalitarian biocentrism’s strict adherence to individualism, Taylor’s position 
is ultimately at odds with ecocentrists and ecological anthropocentrists who insist that 
we generally have stronger moral obligations to protect ecological collectives. 
Although the environmentalist’s application of Smilanskian regret may seem to 
have accomplished little more than to highlight one aspect of Norton’s predicted 
convergence between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists, I argue in Chapter 
Two that it is a more useful tool if it is applied to environmentalists’ concerns about the 
future.  There I suggest that by employing a not-so-ignorant, intertemporal Rawlsian veil, 
the environmentalists identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis can consider 
ecological aspects of various futures that will likely be the result of current and 
proposed environmental policies.  I argue that if in a given future scenario such 
environmentalists find themselves willing to “press the button” to set things ‘right,’ 
even at the expense of their own future proxy’s existence, it should be clear to them 
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which policies would best promote the rationally defensible interests, preferences, and 
values of future humans and which policies would be universally condemned. 
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Chapter Two:  Ecological Anthropocentrism – A New Paradigm 
2.1 A Preliminary Defense of Convergence 
According to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, “provided 
anthropocentrists consider the full breadth of human values as they unfold into the 
indefinite future, and provided nonanthropocentrists endorse a consistent and coherent 
version of the view that nature has intrinsic value, all sides may be able to endorse a 
common policy direction” (Norton 1997:87).  Norton claims that although adherents to 
either ism disagree with one another about the role that motives should play in policy 
endorsement, they agree when it comes to the consequences that should follow—what 
Norton refers to as “protection of the resource base through indefinite time” (Norton 
1984:143).  He argues that it makes no practical difference whether nonhuman nature is 
valued instrumentally as a resource base or intrinsically as a locus of absolute value.   If 
either perspective is coherently and consistently expressed from a rationally adopted 
worldview, it calls for the preservation or conservation of Earth’s species, biodiversity, 
ecosystem processes, and so on. 
However interesting and important the philosophical question of 
whether nonhuman elements of nature have intrinsic value, answers to 
this question do not correspond in any direct way to important 
disagreements regarding environmental objectives and policies.  Long-
sighted anthropocentrists and ecocentrists tend to adopt more and more 
similar policies as scientific evidence is gathered, because both value 
systems—and several others as well—point toward the common-
denominator objective of protecting ecological contexts. 
Environmentalists, of course, will continue to disagree about what should 
be done in particular situations. (Norton 1991:246). 
Norton’s point that needs to be emphasized is that the convergence hypothesis 
concerns a generally agreed upon policy direction.  It does not state that the 
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anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists identified by the hypothesis will always 
endorse the same environmental policies or that their motives will converge.  
Disagreements about what should be done in various particular situations are inevitable 
among environmentalists with disparate beliefs about ultimate values.  However, 
policies that protect larger environmental contexts are largely informed by ecological 
and biological sciences that, although admittedly value-laden, are supposed to be free 
of the value biases endemic in anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric axiologies.  “A 
broadly contextualist approach to environmental policy characterizes the emerging 
consensus among environmentalists, but the policy consensus is not accidental—it is 
forged on the basis of a shared view of science” (ibid.:192).  Environmentalists identified 
by the convergence hypothesis agree that humans and nonhumans are evolutionarily 
continuous and that all life forms require a healthy environment with a stable resource 
base in order to flourish.  These environmentalists also agree that knowledge gained 
from the empirically-grounded earth sciences is an important element of any rationally 
adopted worldview. 
 An instance of the emerging convergence that Norton foresees can be found in 
the overlapping policy goals of the diverse environmental groups working to achieve 
wetlands habitat protection in North America.  Norton points out that several 
anthropocentric groups founded to promote the interests of hunters, anglers, and other 
nature-recreation enthusiasts have long endorsed the same policies to protect wetlands 
habitats that are endorsed by nonanthropocentric groups founded to protect nature for 
its own sake.  Although the values embraced by the members of these diverse groups 
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are in conflict, this has had no practical bearing on the environmental policies they have 
been willing to endorse.  
These groups have worked for the same goals for decades and, while 
they espouse radically different values and use rhetoric offensive to each 
other, they can be expected to continue to support into the indefinite 
policy future the expansion of wetlands protection, more stringent limits 
on activities that destroy wetlands, and restoration of degraded wetlands.  
According to the general picture we have painted of the emerging 
consensus among environmentalists, a generally ecological argument has 
driven these diverse groups into the same policy camp; whether one likes 
wildfowl to shoot at or to look at, whether one touts the rights of birds, 
or whether one sees migratory waterfowl as an important part of a 
"whole" ecological context, our expanding understanding of ecological 
systems enforces on all of these groups the common-denominator 
objective of protecting and restoring wetlands habitats on the flyway 
corridors (ibid.:201—202). 
Still, opponents of Norton’s hypothesis argue that even if a convergence of 
desired consequences is granted in some cases, anthropocentric motives will 
nevertheless invariably derail most attempts to achieve such consequences on the long-
term basis needed since anthropocentrism all too easily permits nonhuman interests to 
be overridden.  According to nonanthropocentrists, anthropocentric worldviews are 
directly responsible for the environmental degradations caused by human societies. 
They argue that therefore, human-centered environmental policies cannot effectively 
redress the ecological predicament but can instead only make it worse.  Because any 
form of anthropocentrism ultimately privileges the satisfaction of human preferences or 
interests over those of nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are concerned that such 
favoritism is “nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias” (Taylor 1981:215) 
that implicitly condones behaviors that are ecologically devastating.  They insist that 
environmental policies must be based on a nonanthropocentric worldview that 
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recognizes the intrinsic value or inherent worth of nonhumanity in order to guarantee 
that such policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their nonvital interests conflict 
with the vital ones of nonhumans.  Nonanthropocentrists argue that on the indefinite 
timescale during which Norton’s anthropocentrically defined resource base is to be 
protected, divergence among anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric 
environmentalists is more likely than convergence. 
Nonanthropocentrists following J. Baird Callicott claim that when nature is solely 
instrumentally valued as a resource base—as Callicott presumes to be the case for 
Norton—its appraisals are ultimately reducible to human-favoring cost-benefit analyses.  
It may be the case that environmentalists with contrary notions of value will endorse 
the same policies that protect wetlands habitats, as Norton points out.  However, 
strictly anthropocentric valuations of such habitats or the species that inhabit them will 
be based on aesthetic, recreational, or other utility-promoting characteristics that can 
be “quantified in a monetary metric” (Callicott 2009:144).  The concern of Callicott and 
many other nonanthropocentrists is that an anthropocentric cost-benefit analysis will 
eventually reveal that humans would more greatly benefit by converting a ‘protected’ 
habitat or ecosystem into an industrial, agricultural or residential area.  Since the 
anthropocentric values in question are open to the same fluctuations as the stock 
market, whereas the nonanthropocentric ones will remain constant, any so-called 
convergence that takes place will be incidental and short-lived at best.  Callicott argues 
that purely anthropocentric motives cannot lead to policies that would indefinitely 
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protect species, habitats, ecosystems, and so on when such protection provides no 
clearly overriding economic benefits to humans.   
If something has only instrumental value, its disposition goes to the 
highest bidder.  If that something is some subsection of nature – say, a 
wetland – conservationists must prove that an economic cost-benefit 
analysis unequivocally indicates that it has greater value as an amenity 
than it has, drained and filled, as a site for a proposed shopping mall.  But 
if the intrinsic value of wetlands were broadly recognised, then 
developers would have to prove that the value to the human community 
of the shopping mall was so great as to trump the intrinsic value of the 
wetland.  The concept of intrinsic value in nature functions politically 
much like the concept of human rights.  Human rights – to liberty, even 
to life – may be over-ridden by considerations of public or aggregate 
utility.  But in all such cases, the burden of proof for doing so rests not 
with the rights holder, but with those who would over-ride human rights.  
And the utilitarian threshold for over-riding human rights is pitched very 
high indeed (Callicott 2002:14). 
 
What Norton’s critics do not seem to fully appreciate is that the convergence 
hypothesis is limited to nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric ideologies that he 
considers to be as “coherent,” “reasonably interpreted” and “suitably broad and long-
sighted” as the “weak” anthropocentrism he defends.  Norton argues that in addition to 
being based on a rationally defensible worldview, a reasonable and coherent 
environmental ethic “cannot be individualistic in the way that standard contemporary 
ethical systems are” (Norton 1984:132).  Only a highly individualistic and short-sighted 
anthropocentrism can condone policies that are based on the satisfaction of individuals’ 
preferences when it is foreseeable that such policies will be detrimental to the 
satisfaction of long-term human interests.  In Chapter One, I argued that when it comes 
to ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum 
according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or 
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collectivistic axiologies.  Among the ideologies that Norton would characterize as the 
most unreasonable and short-sighted are those that are also the most individualistic.  
When either anthropocentrism or nonanthropocentrism is reduced to an ideology that 
champions above all the interests or preferences of individuals, it is incapable of 
informing any coherent policy recommendations concerning the environment.  For 
example, Paul Taylor’s egalitarian biocentrism, according to which each (wild) organism 
has equal inherent worth, could not be consistently or coherently put into practice.  If 
strictly practiced, even disease-causing microorganisms must be accorded the same 
respect and considerations as the organisms they infect. 
If we accept the biocentric outlook and have genuine respect for 
nature. . ., we remain strictly neutral between predator and prey, 
parasite and host, the disease-causing and the diseased.  To take sides in 
such struggles, to think of them in moral terms as cases of the 
maltreatment of innocent victims by evil animals and nasty plants, is to 
abandon the attitude of respect for all wild living things.  It is to count the 
good of some as having greater value than that of others.  This is 
inconsistent with the fundamental presupposition of the attitude of 
respect:  that all living things in the natural world have the same inherent 
worth (Taylor 2011:178). 
 
In an attempt to make his egalitarian biocentrism coherent, Taylor formulates a set of 
priority principles meant to adjudicate the inevitable conflicts of interest that come up 
as a result of everyday behaviors like eating, cleaning or grooming.  According to the 
principle of minimum wrong: 
Each being has inherent worth as an individual and must accordingly be 
treated with respect, regardless of what species it belongs to.  An action 
that brings harm to any one such being constitutes a prima facie wrong 
from which moral agents have a duty to refrain.  To harm several such 
beings is not merely to bring about a certain amount of intrinsic disvalue 
in the world, to be balanced against whatever value might also be 
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produced.  It is to commit a number of violations of duty, corresponding 
to the number of creatures harmed (ibid.:284). 
 
It is not the aggregate amount of disvalue or harm that is relevant here, 
but the number of cases in which one fails to carry out one's duty to 
another being.  Each entity that is harmed is thereby treated unjustly and 
so is wronged.  Because the duty of nonmaleficence is owed to each 
individual organism, it would be morally unjustified to harm a larger 
number of organisms than a smaller number (ibid.:284—285). 
 
In other words, the numbers count.  This certainly has interesting implications for the 
status of microorganisms.  Contrary to the prior claim that parasite and host must be 
accorded the same respect, if we must choose between them, the principle of minimum 
wrong would almost universally require us to choose in favor of the parasite.  Consider, 
for example, that bacteria astronomically outnumber the ‘complex’ organisms they 
inhabit.  As William Grey notes, “There are more e. coli in every human intestine than 
there have ever been homo sapiens” (Grey 1993:466).  According to Taylor’s most basic 
premise, no being is more deserving of existence than any other.  However, if humans 
respected all living things as equally valuable and equally deserving of life, we could not 
engage in simple, everyday activities such as eating, bathing or brushing our teeth.  This 
would present no small challenge for anyone who wanted to use a nonanthropocentric 
“respect for nature” as a basis for generating policies that direct human behavior.  
Victoria Davion points out that Taylor’s brand of nonanthropocentrism is utterly 
impracticable for this reason.  In line with Norton, Davion also suggests that proponents 
of such a worldview may inadvertently distract thinkers from reaching a solution to 
ecological problems that have been wrongly blamed on anthropocentric attitudes. 
The idea that we can meaningfully “revere all life” can make us feel good, 
but such empty slogans may do no more than comfort those who say 
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them, and alienate those who think they are meaningless platitudes.  This 
idea may cause needless rifts between people who should be working 
together (Davion 2006:125). 
 
It is toward the collective end of the individualism-collectivism continuum—
where individuals, communities, species, habitats, ecosystems, and larger ecological 
wholes are appropriately valued—that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place.  At 
its most collective level, anthropocentrism entails a serious consideration of the 
interests, preferences and values of current as well as future members of the species.  
Since it is chiefly concerned with the continued existence of humanity into the indefinite 
future, its recommended policies will be those that protect the environmental 
conditions that promote Homo sapiens’ evolutionary success, which is best measured 
on a geologic timescale.2  Norton thus makes a coherent claim in arguing that policies to 
protect the “resource base” will be maintained indefinitely.  Similarly, because what 
Norton would deem a “reasonably interpreted” version of nonanthropocentrism 
generally values larger collectives over individual entities—including species and the 
ecosystems they require in order to flourish—its recommended policies will also be 
those that attempt to indefinitely protect the “health,” or “integrity,” of the 
environment.  Nonanthropocentrists typically agree with Laura Westra’s assertion that 
“ecological integrity supports. . . the imperative of survival. . . for all, globally” (Westra 
1997:291).  In other words, according to most nonanthropocentrists, what is good for 
nature as a whole is also good for collective humanity.  This supposition converges with 
                                                          
2 More will be said about the moral relevance of a geologic timescale in Chapter Three. 
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the anthropocentrist’s reverse pronouncement of it that what is good for collective 
humanity is also good for nature as a whole.3 
Critics of convergence should also keep in mind the distinction that Norton 
makes between strong anthropocentrism, which is associated with the satisfaction of 
merely felt preferences, and weak anthropocentrism, which is associated with the 
satisfaction of considered preferences. 
A felt preference is any desire or need of a human individual that can at 
least temporarily be sated by some specifiable experience of that 
individual.  A considered preference is any desire or need that a human 
individual would express after careful deliberation, including a judgment 
that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted world 
view—a world view which includes fully supported scientific theories and 
a metaphysical framework interpreting those theories, as well as a set of 
rationally supported aesthetic and moral ideals (Norton 1984:134). 
 
Felt preferences, Norton argues, relate exclusively to the preferences and values of 
individuals and only coincidentally reflect collective preferences or values.  As such, 
there is no guarantee that their satisfaction will not be opposed to the long-term, 
collective interests or values of humanity.  By contrast, he claims, considered 
preferences relate to the preferences and values of collective humanity and reflect the 
full range of human preferences and values worthy of rational support.  Therefore, the 
satisfaction of considered preferences cannot jeopardize collective human interests.  
Because the considered preferences of humanity must be ecologically informed, I prefer 
the term ecological anthropocentrism to weak anthropocentrism.  Ecological 
                                                          
3 Of course, either statement is highly problematic.  If nature as a whole has a good, there may be 
innumerable ecological conditions that would be good for nature but bad for humanity.  There may also 
be innumerable ecological conditions that would be good for collective humanity but bad for a great 
many nonhumans.  In ecological disturbances and successions, there are always losers that accompany 
the winners.  The K-T event that heralded the demise of the dinosaurs provides a clear example. 
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anthropocentrism converges with reasonably interpreted forms of 
nonanthropocentrism that are long-sighted and collectivistic by endorsing 
environmental policies that would promote humanity’s long-term existence over its 
extinction.  
 According to ecological anthropocentrism, environmentalists appropriately 
condemn human-centered worldviews that are short-sighted and that permit avoidable 
ecological degradations that are foreseeably detrimental to humanity’s long-term 
prospects.  However, it is not appropriate to simply equate such worldviews with 
anthropocentrism since it is possible to maintain an ecologically responsible form of 
anthropocentrism.  Along anthropocentrism’s continuum, various forms of egoism, 
personalism, and humanism can be legitimately criticized for implicitly or overtly 
permitting interactions with the environment that are bad for collective humanity, but 
ecological anthropocentrism is free of their most blameworthy characteristics.  
Furthermore, what Frederick Ferré refers to as perspectival anthropocentrism is 
unavoidable since humans “have no choice but to think as humans, to take a human 
point of view even while we try to transcend egoism by cultivating sympathy and 
concern for other centres of intrinsic value” (Ferré 1994:72).  One may thus legitimately 
question whether any form of nonanthropocentrism can offer a coherent alternative at 
all—at least as a guide to human action.  A genuine form of nonanthropocentrism free 
of human biases would likely be unable to provide humans with coherent grounds for 
adjudicating in favor of a particular organism, species, or ecosystem over another, or it 
might even condone policies that would be aggressively misanthropic.  In what follows, I 
39 
will attempt to demonstrate that what Norton would consider a reasonable and 
coherent interpretation of nonanthropocentrism shares more commonalities than 
differences with ecological anthropocentrism.  In fact, as argued in Chapter One, 
because reasonably interpreted forms of nonanthropocentrism favor an Earth inhabited 
by humans to one in which humans are eradicated, it may be more appropriate to 
consider them self-deprecating attempts at ecological anthropocentrism.   
2.2 What’s Wrong with Anthropocentrism?  The Standard Arguments 
Those who reject anthropocentrism as a basis for environmental ethics typically 
claim that it rests upon ontologies and axiologies with problematic, question-begging 
assumptions that serve to justify humanity’s exploitation and degradation of 
nonhumanity.  According to paradigmatic assumptions going back at least to the ancient 
Greeks, humans are ontologically and axiologically privileged among Earth’s life forms. 
However, in the wake of the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions in science, it seems 
bad faith to continue upholding the supernatural assumption that humans are the 
measure or measurers of all things.  As stated by Paul Taylor: 
Now if the groundlessness of the claim that humans are inherently 
superior to other species were brought clearly before our minds, we 
would not remain intellectually neutral toward that claim but would 
reject it as being fundamentally at variance with our total world outlook. 
In the absence of any good reasons for holding it, the assertion of human 
superiority would then appear simply as the expression of an irrational 
and self-serving prejudice that favors one particular species over several 
million others (Taylor 1981:217). 
Nonanthropocentrists criticize the ontological assumption that humans occupy a place 
of central importance in the universe or that humans have privileged access to reality. 
They also criticize axiological assumptions associated with anthropocentrism such as 
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that humans alone have intrinsic value or that persons alone can be harmed, or morally 
wronged.  While these tenets do, indeed, characterize some human-centered 
worldviews, they cannot be attributed to all forms of anthropocentrism.  Although 
ecological anthropocentrism by definition exhibits favoritism toward Homo sapiens, 
such favoritism need not be based on the assumption that humans are objectively 
superior to, or more intrinsically valuable or cosmically important than, nonhumans.  An 
ecological anthropocentrist requires no such mysterious reason for exhibiting favoritism 
toward humanity and would thus likely agree with Bernard Williams’ assessment that 
one’s identity as a human being is reason enough. 
Now there are some people who suppose that if in any way we privilege 
human beings in our ethical thought, if we think that what happens to 
human beings is more important than what happens to other creatures, if 
we think that human beings as such have a claim on our attention and 
care in all sorts of situations in which other animals have less or no claim 
on us, we are implicitly reverting to a belief in the absolute importance of 
human beings.  They suppose that we are in effect saying, when we 
exercise these distinctions between human beings and other creatures, 
that human beings are more important, period, than those other 
creatures.  That objection is simply a mistake.  We do not have to be 
saying anything of that sort at all.  These actions and attitudes need 
express no more than the fact that human beings are more important to 
us, a fact which is hardly surprising (Williams 2006:139). 
 
According to Norton, the considered preferences of ecological anthropocentrism 
are ultimately based on the fundamental belief that a universe with human life and 
consciousness in it is preferable to one without them.  It is simply the case that a 
consistent and sufficiently long-sighted form of anthropocentrism prefers humanity’s 
evolutionary success to its failure.  Norton argues that such favoritism presupposes the 
acceptance of the Axiom of Future Value (AFV). 
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The continuance and thriving of the human species (and its evolutionary 
successors) is a good thing, and every generation is obliged to do what is 
necessary to perpetuate that good.  The obligation to perpetuate and 
protect the human species is therefore accepted as a fundamental moral 
axiom, which exists independently of obligations to individuals (Norton 
1991:216). 
Because nonanthropocentrists generally express a preference for “our world (with us in 
it!)” (Callicott 1984:304) and formulate principles of self-defense and preservation that 
justify, with qualifications, humanity’s exploitation and destruction of nonhumanity in 
order for humans to flourish and remain viable, it seems that most 
nonanthropocentrists at least implicitly subscribe to the AFV.  A nonanthropocentric 
formulation of Norton’s axiom would state that the continuance and thriving of all 
species—including Homo sapiens—is a good thing that we are obliged to perpetuate. 
Although nonanthropocentric environmentalists differ from animal liberationists by 
insisting that we should only be obliged to perpetuate the good of all wild, uncultivated, 
or otherwise naturally occurring species, they formulate principles that make exceptions 
for Homo sapiens, a heavily domesticated species, to go on existing.  
2.3 Anthropocentrism as Ontological Error 
Nonanthropocentrists typically insist that our current ecological crisis can be 
traced to pervasive ideologies that overinflate humanity’s importance in the grand 
scheme of things.  Anthropocentrism is commonly criticized for unjustifiably presuming 
humans to be the central focus of the universe.  Nonanthropocentrists argue that 
because of such hubris, human societies have pursued the exploitation of nonhumanity 
without much regard for the ecological repercussions.  At least since the ancient Greeks, 
orthodox ontologies have assumed that human lives have a cosmic significance or 
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purpose that is incomparably superior to that of nonhumans.  According to Aristotle, for 
example, life forms are naturally arranged in a hierarchy according to their apparent teli, 
with humans situated at the apex of Earth’s biota as the sole animal whose purpose is to 
exercise reason.  Aristotle argued that nonhuman organisms’ inability to reason justifies 
the conclusion that a large part of their teli is to serve humanity.  Although the 
exploitation of nonhumanity would not lead to ecological catastrophe if it were 
performed sustainably and with an appropriate appraisal of its ecological impacts, it is 
not difficult to understand why many environmental thinkers have been quick to blame 
our current ecological predicament on an attitude of self-righteous entitlement to treat 
nonhumanity as nothing more than a resource base.  Since the human population has 
not remained constant over the last couple of millennia but has instead continued to 
grow exponentially, our collective exploitation of Earth’s resources has likewise 
increased exponentially and is intimately connected to the escalating environmental 
problems that threaten our own species’ long-term prospects.   
It is true that the Aristotelian worldview was seemingly supplanted with the 
advent of the supposition of post-Darwinian science that since evolution has no ultimate 
purpose, no life form is objectively higher or lower than any other.  It might seem 
natural for this supposition to be accompanied by the conviction that no organism is 
more entitled to Earth’s resources than any other.  However, as pointed out by Jonathan 
Balcombe, Aristotle’s influence has been incredibly pervasive. 
Since Aristotle first claimed that animals exist to provide humans with 
food and other uses, humans have held themselves apart from all other 
creatures.  Aristotle effectively threw up a great wall between us and 
them.  Its stones are all the ways that we believe ourselves either unique 
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or vastly superior to our animal kin:  our language, our tool use, our 
culture, our technology, our arts, our intelligence.  Its mortar is the 
philosophical and religious teachings that grant us inalienable rights, 
exclusively give us souls, and paint us in the image of God (Balcombe 
2006:25). 
 
Balcombe argues that our everyday anecdotal experiences with animal others, along 
with the empirical observations of ethologists regarding animals’ complex behavioral 
and mental capacities, bolster the post-Darwinian worldview of evolutionary continuity 
and herald that a genuine paradigm shift is underway regarding our commonly held 
ontological assumptions. 
We must put aside the prejudices we hold towards other creatures.  They 
are built on two thousand years of pious presumption that humans are 
the chosen ones, inexorably walled-off from all the others.  Nourished by 
the inescapable knowledge that we are evolutionarily continuous with 
the other beasts, we are now realizing – from scientific study and 
empathic observation – that ours is a planet rich with other minds and 
experiences (ibid.:63). 
 
Although many forms of anthropocentrism stubbornly cling to the Aristotelian 
notion of humanity’s objective superiority and teleological entitlement, 
anthropocentrism that is ecologically informed can only do so in bad faith.  Grey 
indicates the extent to which the traditional ontological assumptions have been 
repudiated by those within the tradition.  
The intellectual history of the past few centuries can be characterized as 
pedestal bashing:  a succession of successful demolitions of comforting 
myths through which we have sought to locate ourselves in the world.  
Freud pointed out that Copernicus was only the first in a line of 
innovative thinkers who overturned the comforts of a traditional world-
view.  First, Copernicus effectively displaced humanity from the physical 
centre of the universe.  A few centuries later Darwin pointed out that 
humanity occupied no biologically privileged position.  Then Freud 
claimed that one of our fondly cherished distinctive characteristics – 
rationality – was mostly a sham (Grey 1993:463). 
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Norton’s concern to protect the resource base for future humans is not based on the 
idea that humans are entitled to these resources or that nonhumanity’s telos is to serve 
as a resource base for humanity.  It is based on the AFV, which he believes requires no 
further justification.  As such, the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton does 
not commit the Aristotelian ontological error commonly criticized by 
nonanthropocentrists.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, although such an error 
may plausibly be associated with overexploitation, it does not necessarily preclude 
sustainable exploitation. 
2.4 Do Humans Have Privileged Access to Reality? 
A closely related ontological assumption associated with anthropocentrism is 
that, of all Earth’s life forms, humans alone have genuine access to reality.  It is this 
access to reality that is supposed to justify the assumption that humans are objectively 
superior to nonhumans.  For thinkers in the rationalist tradition following Plato, the 
world can be divided into two realms—the sensible realm of becoming and the real, or 
true, realm of being.  Because the realm of the senses is ever-changing and can be 
accessed by any viable life form capable of sensation and perception, its worth is 
deemed insignificant in comparison to that of the changeless realm of truth that is only 
accessed by rational beings.  The capacity for reason supposedly grants humans 
privileged access to reality—it enables them to transcend the sensible material world 
inhabited by all other things on Earth and apprehend ‘higher’ things like truth, beauty, 
and value.  Furthermore, transcendental access to reality is presumed to imbue humans 
with the absolute worth that, in the rationalist tradition, is required for membership in 
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the moral community.  One of the most influential thinkers to support this view was 
Immanuel Kant, who claimed that we have the universally binding duty to treat all 
humans, including ourselves, as ends and never merely as means. 
The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the 
sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission 
from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its 
interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life 
and, where possible, in a future life as well.  But he is nevertheless not so 
completely an animal as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its 
own and to use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs 
as a sensible being.  For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in 
worth above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of 
what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only 
a particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the 
same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to a 
higher end (Kant 1996:189—190). 
 
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they 
are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and 
are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons 
because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, 
as something that may not be used merely as a means (Kant 1996:79). 
 
For environmentalists who equate nature with the material, sensible world, the 
transcendence assumption is interpreted as entailing that humanity’s true place, or 
higher end, (as Kant suggests, happiness “in a future life”) is not to be found within 
nature but instead, utterly removed from it—that humans are essentially supernatural 
beings and are thus fundamentally discontinuous with the rest of Earth’s biota.  
Ecologically grounded nonanthropocentrists claim that this has troubling implications 
when it comes to environmental policies.  The transcendence assumption purportedly 
commits those who hold it to an inherently human-favoring axiology.  If it is granted 
that transcendental access to reality is required for an entity to possess the absolute 
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worth or intrinsic value needed to be morally considerable and that only persons are so 
qualified, the anthropogenic degradation and exploitation of species, ecosystems, and 
so on are not causes for direct moral condemnation unless persons are directly harmed. 
Ecological anthropocentrists share many of the same worries that 
nonanthropocentrists do concerning the objective status of these ontological 
assumptions.  A biologically and ecologically informed worldview entails that Homo 
sapiens is one species among many others and is part of nature rather than apart from it.  
According to ecological anthropocentrism, the material world is the real world, and 
rational beings cannot transcend it to apprehend a truer one, whether by mental 
acrobatics or by some other means.  No being’s access to reality is more genuine than 
another’s, despite the vast differences that may exist regarding their knowledge of 
reality.  According to an ecologically and biologically grounded view, the access that 
beings have to reality by means of sensation and perception differs not in kind but by 
degrees.  Humans are certainly more knowledgeable than nonhumans about aspects of 
reality that are deemed important by humans.  However, this does not justify any 
assumption that humans are therefore more cosmically important than nonhumans.  
Ecological anthropocentrists do not require the transcendence assumption to justify the 
ethical favoritism they exhibit toward humans.  The AFV does not favor entities 
according to their knowledge of reality but on the basis of their humanity or the degree 
to which their existence promotes the satisfaction of humanity’s considered preferences. 
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2.5 Anthropocentrism as Axiological Error 
Consensus on post-Darwinian and post-Copernican suppositions of humanity’s 
place in nature and in the universe makes it easy to dismiss the ontological errors 
associated with traditional forms of anthropocentrism.  As Tim Hayward astutely notes, 
however, such dismissal does not adequately address the assumption presumed to 
follow such errors that only humans are morally considerable. 
Now while the ontological assumption is consistent with, and may even 
seem to support, the ethical view that only humans are of ethical value, it 
does not strictly entail it; conversely, one could hold that ethical view 
without subscribing to an anthropocentric ontology.  Therefore, the 
reasons there may be for refusing an anthropocentric ontology do not 
necessarily have any direct bearing on anthropocentrism in ethics. 
Criticism of the latter, therefore, cannot borrow force or credibility from 
criticisms of the former.  An independent account is required of why 
anthropocentrism in ethics is wrong, and, indeed, what it means to 
overcome anthropocentrism in ethics (Hayward 1997:51). 
Anthropocentrically-based environmental policies are presumed by many 
nonanthropocentrists to hierarchically attribute intrinsic value to humans such that 
humans are afforded existential rights, privileges, and protections denied to nonhumans.  
Nonanthropocentrists who hold this view assume that without being ascribed intrinsic 
value, an entity will not be acknowledged to have a good or interests of its own that 
entities with intrinsic value are required to recognize.  Since according to most ethical 
frameworks—including ones typically proffered by nonanthropocentrists—an entity 
lacking intrinsic value is not believed to be morally considerable in or for itself, any 
rights it may be granted to exist will be easily overridden by the incomparably stronger 
rights of intrinsically valuable entities to use it as a means.  According to 
nonanthropocentrists, since on anthropocentric views all nonhuman aspects of the 
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environment, biotic or abiotic, are of merely instrumental value and are viewed as a 
resource base, their exploitation and utilization in the pursuit of human ends are 
deemed justifiable—regardless of how frivolous those ends may be—as long as the 
costs are bearable.  The pervasiveness of such views purportedly accounts for the 
widespread adoption of environmental policies that have collectively facilitated radical 
ecosystem transformations on a mounting, global scale and the ongoing mass extinction 
of Earth’s biota as well as the overuse of toxic and limited resources.   
Callicott claims that the emergence of environmental ethics in response to 
humanity’s ecological predicament represents a paradigm shift in moral philosophy.  
According to Callicott, the paradigm shift, as was foreseen by Aldo Leopold, entails an 
expansion of the entities acknowledged by traditional ethics to have intrinsic value.  
Callicott argues that insofar as traditional ethical frameworks anthropocentrically limit 
their attributions of intrinsic value to humanity, they fail to provide moral reasons for 
criticizing humanity’s ecologically irresponsible behaviors.  Although Norton’s brand of 
anthropocentrism provides plenty of practical reasons to criticize such behaviors, 
Callicott considers such reasons a betrayal of “the revolutionary aspirations of 
theoretical environmental ethics,” (Callicott 1984:299) the focus of which should be “to 
provide theoretical grounds for the moral standing or moral considerability of non-
human natural entities, natural communities, or nature as a whole” (ibid.:300). 
There is something clearly morally wrong about this human assault on 
non-human forms of life and natural systems.  Normal (anthropocentric) 
moral theory, however, can only explicate this intuitively felt wrongness 
in terms of actual and potential losses of natural resources (either 
material or spiritual) and disruption of natural services.  But there seems 
to be something wrong about the radical destruction of non-human life 
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on Earth and/or the ubiquitous replacement by human beings and human 
symbionts of non-human forms of life that goes beyond the 
diminishment of natural aesthetic amenities, or the loss of medical or 
other resources, or even the destabilization of the human life support 
system, "Spaceship Earth," (as sometimes it is called from a subconscious 
anthropocentric point of view) (ibid.:300). 
 
Holmes Rolston expresses a similar disdain for Norton’s refusal to ground his 
environmental ethic on the notion that nonhuman nature has intrinsic value.  Although 
Rolston admits that “Norton is likely right enough often enough that saving species as 
resources. . . makes good anthropocentric sense in setting national policy” (Rolston 
2009:99), he accuses Norton’s anthropocentric motives of being morally impure. 
The goods sought curve back in on ourselves, and no matter how much 
we enlarge the circle with increasing enlightenment, eventually the curve 
comes back to us and reveals the underlying motivation as self-interest, 
something less than fully moral (Rolston 2009:99). 
 
Although Callicott and Rolston reject Norton’s convergence hypothesis, it seems 
that they do so more on the basis of his presumably “less than fully moral” motives than 
because of the environmental policies that would be endorsed by his anthropocentrism.  
By attributing greater intrinsic value to wild species and the habitats they require in 
order to remain wild, Callicott and Rolston would tend to condone the same 
environmental policies as the ecological anthropocentrism defended by Norton.  Even 
from a purely instrumental valuation of nature, it can be determined that humans 
should prefer a biosphere that maintains the health and viability of Earth’s current biota 
since the costs of its degradation would be too high for humans in the long run.  From a 
nonanthropocentric perspective that intrinsically values nature, the emphasis merely 
shifts such that it is noted that both humans and wild nonhumans will benefit from a 
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healthy biosphere and that the costs of its degradation, or loss of intrinsic value, would 
be too high for both.  
2.6 How Effective Is the Concept of Intrinsic Value on Our Behaviors? 
According to Callicott, because of the widespread belief in the developed world 
that humans are intrinsically valuable, our policies ensure that we treat fellow humans 
as ends with a good of their own—regardless of what little instrumental value they may 
have for us.  He argues that the intrinsic valuation of humanity has had the practical 
effect of instilling in us a strong belief in human rights.  Without such a concept, we 
would purportedly treat one another as mere objects. 
If anthropocentric intrinsic value were not publicly recognized and legally 
institutionalized, we would simply dispose of one another—when that 
time comes—as we discard things that are of value solely instrumentally, 
such as broken tools, junk cars, and withered house plants (Callicott 
2009:143—144). 
Nonanthropocentrists like Callicott believe that if the intrinsic valuation of nonhumanity 
were just as common, our environmental policies would ensure that we treat it with the 
same respect we show to fellow humans.   
One problem with Callicott’s line of reasoning is that, in spite of our presumably 
universal respect for the intrinsic value of humanity, we have plenty of policies and 
practices that permit us either to treat fellow humans as means only or to ignore their 
vital needs.  Abortion, for example, is a widely accepted practice in the environmentally 
sensitive, developed world and involves disposing of a human in much the same way 
that “broken tools, junk cars” and other instrumentally valued things are discarded. 
Also, in spite of the fact that there are millions of fellow humans suffering from poverty, 
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disease, and other misfortunes whose suffering could be greatly alleviated by our 
collective actions, our policies permit us to ignore their plight.4  If attributions of 
intrinsic value do not help protect or preserve humans on a global scale, on what basis 
should we believe they will radically alter our interactions with the environment, which 
encompasses the entire planet?  Callicott notes that human rights to life can be 
overridden by utilitarian considerations but that the threshold for overriding these 
rights is “very high indeed.”  It is true that, except for cases involving fetuses in the early 
stages of development, our policies enforce negative duties to avoid unjustifiably 
harming fellow humans.  However, our policies do not enforce positive duties to 
preserve or protect the lives of fellow humans apart from in those circumstances in 
which we are broadly recognized to be responsible for their care.  Such circumstances 
are typically familial.  Thus, the human right to life, which is presumably based on the 
notion of humanity’s intrinsic value, is more easily overridden than Callicott suggests.  
Besides, racism, sexism, xenophobia, classism, and other institutionalized forms of 
human devaluation are still prevalent in modern societies even though Callicott assumes 
that universal acknowledgement of humanity’s intrinsic value means such societies are 
ready for the next evolutionary step in morality—to embrace the land ethic, or 
nonanthropocentrism.  If such societies are overtly influenced by an anthropocentric 
axiology that values humanity intrinsically, it is problematic to assert that 
anthropocentrism pertains solely to their members’ negative interactions with the 
                                                          
4 I return to this topic in Chapter Three. 
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environment but not to their negative interactions with one another or to their lack of 
concern for other humans separated from them by space and time.   
Both intrinsic and instrumental valuations are expressed in various degrees 
according to a valuer’s context, and things that are considered instrumentally valuable 
are often afforded greater rights, privileges, and protections than things that are 
purportedly intrinsically valuable.  For example, pet owners who believe that humans 
alone are intrinsically valuable still tend to favor preserving the lives of their pets over 
the lives of humans with whom, through the vicissitudes of the natural lottery, they are 
unacquainted.  The nonanthropocentric critique, however, cannot adequately explain 
why vast numbers of people—presumed to be under the sway of an anthropocentrism 
that values humans intrinsically but nonhumans instrumentally—so readily purchase 
food and luxury items for their pets while disregarding fellow humans who are 
undernourished, abandoned, or impoverished.  Indeed, as research by Sena De Silva and 
Giovanni Turchini indicates, consumers in the West expend a tremendous amount of 
resources on their pets that we might think would instead be spent on fellow humans if 
a belief in humanity’s intrinsic value in fact accounted for their behavior. 
The market for pet food and pet care products has been reported to be 
growing at an annual average rate of 4% in value terms and reached 
US$49 billion in 2003, with pet food representing about 80% of the global 
pet industry market.  Recent market research also reported that the pet 
food market has been experiencing a trend towards premium and super-
premium products.  It has been hypothesized that pet owners are 
treating their companions progressively more as a family member, and 
consequently, expenditure on pet food is growing.  Premium and super-
premium cat food often include high content of chopped or whole forage 
fish such as pilchard and sardines, and in some instances even tuna (De 
Silva and Turchini 2008:460-461). 
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The central issue is not an advocacy of pets versus aquaculture or other 
agricultural/animal husbandry activities, but the need for a more 
objective and a pragmatic approach to the use of a limited and a 
decreasing biological resource, for human benefit (ibid.:465). 
 
Of course, not all who are human-centered are pet lovers.  Anthropocentrists 
who appeal to humanity’s intrinsic value and consistently favor humans over 
nonhumans may nevertheless disagree about whether the ultimate locus of such value 
is genetic humanity or personhood.  If the locus of value is genetic humanity, as it is for 
simple humanism, then fetuses and humans declared brain dead are just as intrinsically 
valuable as any fully functioning human is.  If, by contrast, what is intrinsically valuable is 
personhood—a cluster concept of such ideal human traits as sentience, self-awareness, 
abstract linguistic communication, autonomy, moral agency, and so on—then there are 
plenty of humans who lack intrinsic value altogether, some have more intrinsic value 
than others (by virtue of having either more traits characteristic of personhood or some 
traits to a greater degree), and some nonhumans might have intrinsic value comparable 
to or surpassing that of humans.   
If the policies that permit abortion are based on the concept of intrinsic value, it 
is the intrinsic value of persons rather than of humans since these policies imply that the 
rights, interests, or preferences of persons outweigh those of humans and in the case of 
actual persons trump those of persons who do not yet exist.  For personalists such as 
Alberto Giubilini, although fetuses and infants are already actual humans, they can only 
count as potential persons—“people who will exist, unless we perform some act, for 
example, an abortion, or unless something naturally happens that causes [them] to die” 
(Giubilini 2012:50).  Every embryo, fetus and infant on the planet is accordingly a 
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potential person with merely potential rights to exist.  Because they lack the cluster of 
traits required for personhood, they cannot be harmed by anything that we do.  Possible 
persons, on the other hand, do not actually exist but are merely theoretical—“people 
who will exist, provided that some action is performed, such as fecundation of an ovum,” 
(ibid.:50) or that something natural happens that causes them to exist.  Since possible 
persons lack any traits of personhood, they cannot be harmed by our actions, either.   
Giubilini is aware that his argument could be construed as implying that we 
should not have any obligations to persons of the distant future.  For example, we need 
not worry about the environmental conditions they will face as a result of our current 
behaviors.  Since they do not exist and cannot be harmed by us, any sacrifices we make 
on their behalf to preserve or protect a ‘healthy’ biosphere with a stable resource base 
would presumably be supererogatory.  In order to avoid dealing with such implications, 
Giubilini defines future persons thusly. 
By “future people” I simply mean people who do not exist yet and who 
will exist in a time distant from now, regardless of what choices we make 
now.  For example, the people who will inhabit this world in the year 
2150 are to be considered “future people,” even though we do not know 
who they will be.  In the same way, the son a woman will have, if she has 
any son at all in the future, is a “future person.”  The expression “future 
people” can be taken as equivalent to the expression “actual people of 
the future” (ibid.:50). 
 
By conceiving of future persons as “actual people of the future,” Giubilini places them in 
the same moral category as actual persons of the present.  Thus, he can claim that if we 
have obligations to maintain a healthy resource base for current persons, we have 
similar obligations to do so for those in the future.  Giubilini defines future people as 
those who will exist “regardless of what choices we make now.”  However, we should 
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not be fooled by his definitional sleight of hand since it fails to appreciate the key insight 
from Derek Parfit’s paradox that people who exist in the future will do so precisely 
because of the choices we make now.  Even slight alterations in the meetings of future 
breeding pairs (which will be determined by the choices we make now) will result in 
entirely different offspring with unique genetic, phenotypic, and ontogenetic 
characteristics.  In this regard, future persons are possible persons.  They ‘exist’ in a 
more distant future, but this should not grant them more actuality than is granted to 
possible persons who are temporally closer to us.  If anything, their status as persons 
should be less actual since the details of their existence are less foreseeable. Although 
environmentalists may disagree about whether or not nonhumans should be 
intrinsically valued, they converge on an insistence that entities in the future should be 
fairly represented in our moral deliberations.  It is for this reason that the person-
affecting bias as expressed by Giubilini would not provide a coherent basis for informing 
environmental policies.   
2.7 The Person-Affecting Intuition and Parfit’s Paradox 
According to the person-affecting bias, or intuition, if an action or policy is to be 
construed as good or bad in a morally relevant sense, it must at least be good or bad for 
some person.  In other words, only persons can be harmed.  An entity must therefore 
express, or in a less restrictive sense, be capable of expressing, personhood if it is to gain 
full admittance to the moral community.  Although some personalists are willing to 
recognize personhood in nonhumans, there is much controversy concerning whether or 
not there are in fact any nonhuman persons, and the number of nonhumans that qualify 
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as potential candidates for personhood is miniscule.  Thus in practice, the bias almost 
universally picks out the set of humans who have the relevant cluster of person-imbuing 
traits.  Nonanthropocentrists reject the notion that persons alone can be harmed on the 
grounds that nonhuman aspects of Earth have a good of their own which can be 
violated by humans.  According to Callicott, for example, harms are committed when 
humans thwart the ‘normal’ existential trajectory of ‘natural’ kinds of being.  “A thing is 
right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal 
scales.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Callicott 1999:138).  For example, 
regardless of whether or not their members exhibit any personalistic traits, species are 
harmed when they are anthropogenically extirpated at rates that exceed the natural, 
background rate of extinction.  Because the person-affecting bias does not recognize 
such harms, nonanthropocentrists claim, it cannot serve as the basis of a reasonable 
environmental policy.   
Despite this point, it should be noted that membership in humanity’s moral 
community is not required in order for an entity to be granted strong existential rights.  
Although a personalist may grant stronger existential rights to organisms that exhibit 
personalistic traits, life forms may nevertheless be protected for reasons that are 
pragmatically human-serving.  Mary Anne Warren explains: 
We need to reject fallacious forms of anthropocentrism; but not all forms of 
anthropocentrism are fallacious.  It is not fallaciously anthropocentric to give 
priority in our moral deliberations to living things which are close enough to us in 
time and space to be affected by our actions, and close enough that their fate 
will affect us or future human generations.  Nor is it illegitimate to recognize 
stronger moral obligations to those living things which resemble human beings in 
morally significant respects.  (Warren 1997:44) 
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Parfit identifies a deeper problem arising from the person-affecting intuition.  
Environmental policies that are person-affecting or otherwise emphasize the rights of 
identifiable individuals are only coherent on brief scales of time.  Although exercising 
our current rights to frivolously and unsustainably consume toxic or limited resources 
may foreseeably decrease the quality of life possible for many humans who will likely be 
born a few centuries from now, alternative policies that would restrict such rights could, 
for all we know, turn out much worse for them.  After all, significant alterations to our 
current lifestyles will also alter the conditions that will determine whatever future 
beings exist.   
Suppose that we are choosing between two social or economic policies.  
And suppose that, on one of the two policies, the standard of living 
would be slightly higher over the next century.  This effect implies 
another.  It is not true that, whichever policy we choose, the same 
particular people will exist in the further future.  Given the effects of two 
such policies on the details of our lives, it would increasingly over time be 
true that, on the different policies, people married different people.  And, 
even in the same marriages, the children would increasingly over time be 
conceived at different times.  As I have argued, children conceived more 
than a month earlier or later would in fact be different children.  Since 
the choice between our two policies would affect the timing of later 
conceptions, some of the people who are later born would owe their 
existence to our choice of one of the two policies.  If we had chosen the 
other policy, these particular people would never have existed.  And the 
proportion of those later born who owe their existence to our choice 
would, like ripples in a pool, steadily grow.  We can plausibly assume that, 
after three centuries, there would be no one living in our community who 
would have been born whichever policy we chose.  (It may help to think 
about this question:  how many of us could truly claim, 'Even if railways 
and motor cars had never been invented, I would still have been born'?) 
(Parfit 1984:361) 
 
In spite of our current judgment that further ecological degradations would 
make the Earth an unfit home for future humans, Parfit argues that many who would 
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exist in such a future would deem their lives worth living and would prefer existence 
over nonexistence.  If policies are based on the interests of future humans such as these, 
almost any policy can be justified.  Robin Attfield explains: 
Our obligations cannot simply consist in advantaging them or in not 
harming them, since their very existence would depend on present 
choices, and they would not exist otherwise.  So we cannot ask whether 
one policy or another would harm or benefit them, as there is no possible 
alternative impact of our actions on them with which to compare the 
quality of life that they are likely to have if we choose policies that bring 
them into being.  To harm someone has usually been regarded as 
implicitly making him or her worse off than he or she would have been 
otherwise; but such a person is someone who would not have existed 
otherwise, that is, in the absence of these policies.  But if this is the case, 
then most of such people cannot be harmed (Attfield 2007:365). 
 
Such considerations led Parfit to reject the person-affecting intuition and to claim that 
ethical considerations should instead be essentially impersonal.  As both Parfit and 
Attfield conclude, it would be wise to care about our impacts on the quality of life of 
future humans even if such beings presently have no discernible identity and cannot, by 
Parfit’s argument, be harmed by what we do.  Such concern for the future exemplifies 
anthropocentrism at the species level, or ecological anthropocentrism.  At the level of 
the individual, anthropocentrism devolves into egoism and is thus reduced to 
spatiotemporal scales that are only relevant to individuals—typically, no more than a 
handful of generations. 
Although all forms of anthropocentrism preferentially value humanity, such 
preference can be manifested individually or collectively.  Ecological anthropocentrism 
pluralistically values humanity in its most collective form, at the level of the species.  
Roughly speaking, what is ultimately valuable for, good for, or in the interests of a 
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species is its long-term evolutionary success.  To some extent, such success can be 
measured as the species’ persistence in the geologic record.  Since the Pleistocene, 
Homo sapiens has exhibited impressive geospatial persistence; however, this successful 
proliferation has thus far been brief.  A sufficiently broad and long-sighted valuation of 
the human species entails simultaneously valuing the ecosystems and nonhumans that 
will plausibly enable human societies to persist on a geologic scale of time.  Even if 
ecosystems and nonhumans are thereby only instrumentally valued for promoting long-
term human interests, such valuation obstructs policies that permit ecological 
degradation.  In fact, it will converge with “reasonably interpreted” forms of 
nonanthropocentrism and lead to policies that promote the preservation or 
conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity, and so on.   
2.8 Implications for the Ineliminability of Perspectival Anthropocentrism 
Founders of the emerging branches of environmental and animal philosophy 
have been largely united in defining their positions as a condemnation of, and an 
attempt to offer alternatives to, the human-centered worldviews that have historically 
dominated philosophical narratives.  But even though environmental and animal 
philosophers have been highly critical of anthropocentrism, their critiques have 
nevertheless reflected human systems of value.  Ultimately, in spite of their 
condemnations of human-centered worldviews, they typically find ways to introduce 
humanistic or personalistic elements through the back door without considering 
themselves human-centered for doing so.  This suggests not only that something is 
ineliminable about anthropocentrism, but that anthropocentrism itself is not really the 
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problem targeted by these thinkers.  If so-called nonanthropocentric worldviews are 
capable of informing what Norton would consider “reasonable” environmental policies, 
it is only because of their human-centered foundation.  Callicott, for example, freely 
admits that his nonanthropocentrism is humanistic in the sense that “intrinsic value 
ultimately depends on humans” (Callicott 1984:305).5  Like other nonanthropocentrists, 
Callicott also formulates second-order priority principles that conveniently adjudicate in 
favor of humans in many instances in which their interests conflict with those of 
nonhumans. 
The land ethic is intended to supplement, not replace, the more 
venerable community-based social ethics, in relation to which it is an 
accretion or addition.  …  Choice among which community-related 
principle should govern a moral agent’s conduct in a given moral 
quandary may be determined by the application of two second-order 
principles.  The first, SOP-1, requires an agent to give priority to the first-
order principles generated by the more venerable and intimate 
community memberships.  Thus, when holistic environment-oriented 
duties are in direct conflict with individualistic human-oriented duties, 
the human-oriented duties take priority.  The land ethic is, therefore, not 
a case of ecofascism.  However, the second second-order principle, SOP-2, 
requires an agent to give priority to the stronger interests at issue 
(Callicott 1999:75). 
 
Although it would appear that a nonhuman’s basic survival represents a stronger 
interest than a human’s desire for meat, Callicott does not argue that humans should 
resort to cruelty-free foraging.  His second-order principles, in other words, do not seem 
to require humans to forego most of the interests, preferences, and values generated by 
a strict adherence to their community’s established, human-centered, first-order ethical 
                                                          
5 Callicott later softened this statement somewhat by claiming that value may be “vertebragenic, since 
nonhuman animals, all vertebrates at the very least, are conscious and therefore may be said, in the 
widest sense of the term, to value things” (Callicott 1992:138).  In a recent conversation, Callicott did not 
disagree with my suggestion that all organisms that perceive the world may be said to value it. 
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principles.  Ultimately, “the duties attendant upon citizenship in the biotic community 
(to preserve its integrity, stability, and beauty) do not cancel or replace the duties 
attendant on membership in the human global village (to respect human rights)” 
(ibid.:71—72). 
Some thinkers have questioned the overall coherence of a nonanthropocentric 
worldview.  If humans and what humans care about are not accorded preference, then 
on what basis can human individuals or societies adjudicate in favor of one organism, 
species, or ecosystem over any other?  As Hayward argues, there is a sense in which it is 
impossible for a human to formulate a genuinely nonanthropocentric axiology. 
As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will 
be limited by this fact.  It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a 
radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the 
adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely 
unrelated to any existing human values.  Any attempt to construct a 
radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be 
arbitrary – because founded on no certain knowledge – but also to be 
more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a 
matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without 
certain warrant for doing so (Hayward 1997:56). 6 
 
According to Grey, if it were possible to rid ourselves of perspectival anthropocentrism, 
only stupendous luck would guarantee that our environmental policies were beneficial 
to humanity.   
Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are 
confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we 
consider biological history over a billion year time scale.  The problem 
with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been 
                                                          
6 The point made here is not that nonhuman values cannot exist independently of humanity.  Regardless 
of whether or not such values exist, any thoughts a human can entertain about them are inextricably 
filtered through a human lens.  In other words, human values = values humans have. 
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proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of 
which are at all congenial to us (Grey 1993:473).   
 
Warren states the problem thusly: 
We are not gods but human beings, reasoning about how we ought to 
think and act.  Our moral theories can only be based upon what we know 
and what we care about, or ought to care about.  If this makes our 
theories anthropocentric, then this much anthropocentrism is inevitable 
in any moral theory that is relevant to human actions (Warren, 1997:43). 
 
If a nonanthropocentric perspective were genuinely free of human relatedness, 
it would display no preference for environmental conditions that promote human 
existence.  If nonanthropocentrism is egalitarian, or fair to all aspects of nature, as in 
holistic rationalism, it can provide no non-question-begging justification for favoring the 
existence of any particular organism, species, or ecological condition rather than 
another.  Although from an anthropocentric perspective, it is distressing to note that 
biotic recoveries can take millions of years after a mass extinction event or that 
anthropogenically disturbed ecosystems may never ‘return’ to their pre-disturbance 
states, a “suitably broad and long-sighted” nonanthropocentrism would be utterly 
indifferent.  As ecologists point out, in any ecological disturbance, there are not only 
losers but also winners.   
Environmental disturbances are often viewed only in terms of their 
harmful impacts on the affected species.  However, in any disturbance 
some species will benefit.  If that disturbance is widespread and 
persistent, the beneficiary species will expand their range and replace 
those that cannot survive (McKinney and Lockwood 1999:450). 
 
Anthropogenic factors that environmentalists construe as destructive to nature can be 
seen as creative when viewed in a larger context.  After all, we are the result of the 
biosphere’s capacity to bounce back from catastrophic events such as those that ended 
63 
the Permian and Cretaceous time periods.  Were it not for massive ecological 
disturbances periodically occurring throughout the geologic past, the ecosystems and 
species that humans care about and want to protect would never have existed.  The 
current, human-induced mass extinction event also has a silver lining if viewed from a 
holistic rationalist’s nonanthropocentric perspective.  While it may be bad for Earth’s 
tenured biota, that is only a temporary setback.  If we consider that a biotic ‘recovery’ 
has followed every mass extinction so far, including the end-Permian event that resulted 
in a loss of possibly 95% of all species, a similar recovery after the anthropogenic mass 
extinction is certainly plausible.  
2.9 What Would Genuine Nonanthropocentrism Entail? 
What sort of environmental policies would a legitimately nonanthropocentric 
axiology entail?  Perhaps the strongest support for Norton’s convergence hypothesis is 
that in order for the views of nonanthropocentrism to be “reasonably interpreted,” they 
must adjudicate in favor of (reasonable) human biases.  In other words, they must 
already be, in an important sense, anthropocentric.  As Grey notes, on the broad 
spatiotemporal scale according to which nature, life, the biosphere, and so on are 
intrinsically valued as having a good of their own, there do not appear to be grounds for 
declaring any particular assemblage of species and ecosystems to be better than 
another.  
If the concerns for humanity and nonhuman species raised by advocates 
of deep ecology are expressed as concerns about the fate of the planet, 
then these concerns are misplaced.  From a planetary perspective, we 
may be entering a phase of mass extinction of the magnitude of the 
Cretaceous.  For planet Earth that is just another incident in a four and a 
half billion year saga.  Life will go on – in some guise or other.  The 
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arthropods, algae and the ubiquitous bacteria, at least, will almost 
certainly be around for a few billion years more.  And with luck and good 
management, some of the more complex and interesting creatures, such 
as ourselves, may continue for a while longer as well.  Of course our 
present disruptive and destructive activities are, or should be, of great 
concern to us all.  But that is a quite properly human concern, expressing 
anthropocentric values from an anthropocentric perspective (Grey 
1993:468—469). 
 
The fundamental problem is that we can rank preferences only given 
some anthropocentric bearings.  An austerely ecocentric or biocentric 
perspective delivers no determinate answer as to which of the abundant 
and wonderfully various unfolding planetary biotas should be preferred 
(Grey 1993:470). 
 
A genuinely nonanthropocentric axiology cannot be humanistic in the sense that it 
provides priority principles that favor our particular species.   
In fact, one could plausibly argue that genuine forms of nonanthropocentrism 
would require aggressively misanthropic policies.  Consider what would be implied by an 
ethic founded on a genuinely nonanthropocentric formulation of the Axiom of Future 
Value. 
The continuance and thriving of all species (and their evolutionary 
successors) is a good thing, and every generation (of humans) is obliged 
to do what is necessary to perpetuate that good.  The obligation to 
perpetuate and protect all species is therefore accepted as a 
fundamental moral axiom, which exists independently of obligations to 
individuals (adapted from Norton 1991:216). 
 
Notice that since this axiom values all species, Homo sapiens is included.  However, 
there are at least a couple of reasons that Homo sapiens might not fare so well from any 
policies that the axiom would implicitly endorse.  If we are obliged to do what is 
necessary to ensure that all species continue to exist and to thrive, a conflict of interests 
is evident.  One could argue that as long as humans exist, it is impossible for all species 
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to thrive.  The anthropogenic restructuring of Earth’s resources has already precluded 
the possibility that many extant nonhuman species will thrive, especially those that have 
become endangered as a result of humanity’s presence.  Many others have been 
displaced from the habitats in which they would ‘naturally’ thrive.  If by favoring all 
species, it is implied that the greatest number of species should be allowed to exist, the 
nonanthropocentric conservationist would likely sacrifice our single species for the 
benefit of the rest.  Furthermore, nonanthropocentrists typically argue that an adequate 
environmental ethic “should provide differential intrinsic value for wild and domestic 
organisms and species” (Callicott 1984:304).  Since humans are highly domesticated, it 
would seem that they should be valued less than the nonhumans that would count as 
wild. 
 If the nonanthropocentrist’s axiom were modified to call for the continuance and 
thriving of all wild, undomesticated, and otherwise naturally occurring species, it would 
seem that very few, if any, humans could qualify.  Perhaps one could argue that the 
continuance and thriving of globalized human societies is a necessary evil since they can 
develop vaccinations and other medical treatments that will promote the continuance 
and thriving of wild nonhumans.  This argument would also fail for a couple of reasons.  
The “natural” background rate of species extinctions was very low when humans did not 
exist, and diseases have almost never been identified as the primary cause of a species’ 
extinction.  On the other hand, because of human encroachment and various other 
anthropogenic factors, nonhuman species are disappearing at up to 10,000 times the 
natural rate.  The number of wild species that human technology could save from 
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extinction is incomparably lower than the number that would become extinct as a result 
of human technology.  If we were to do what is necessary to perpetuate the 
continuance and thriving of all wild species, we should at least be obligated to ‘return’ 
humanity to a condition of sustainable living.  A noted by Lisa Newton, this would 
require the planet’s human population to be greatly reduced. 
There is a way for human beings to live completely sustainably on this 
earth, in a way that leaves no “environmental footprint” at all, and we 
did it for millions of years, or at least tens of thousands (depending on 
how you set the borders of “we humans”).  The life that is totally 
environmentally sustainable (that is, can be carried on indefinitely 
without compromising its biological support system at all) is called 
“foraging,” or “hunting/gathering.”  This is the way every species except 
the human species lives – whatever nature has provided in the way of 
edibles, the creatures find and consume, usually according to patterns 
very stable over time.  It is not clear how many people the earth could 
sustain in this manner; possibly one-tenth of one percent of the number 
currently living on the earth, or six million souls.  The yield of human food 
per acre in the wild is not large, and if several human groups foraged in 
the same territory, there could come a time when there would not be 
enough for all, and the weaker groups would be crowded out, or driven 
off, and would starve.  That is the way it happens with every species 
other than the human.  Eventually, had we remained foragers, the human 
population would have spread into all viable zones in numbers that could 
be sustained, and the population would have leveled off at about six 
million.  The story of human life, development, existence, and eventual 
extinction, would have followed the pattern of every other species – or at 
least, the pattern that every other species would have followed had not 
human beings intervened (Newton 2005:2). 
 
Newton does not mention the evidence that links foraging humans with the onset of the 
current anthropogenic mass extinction event.  As early humans left Africa and Eurasia, 
their appearance in novel territories is strongly correlated with the extinction of most of 
the large mammalian species along the path of their invasion, suggesting that they 
foraged at unsustainable levels.  It seems likely that groups of hunter-gatherers could 
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only forage sustainably if they were highly educated about ecology and biology and 
highly motivated to preserve and conserve all the species affected by their activities.  It 
also seems likely, however, that humans are far too bored and clever to ever be satisfied 
with a foraging lifestyle.  Thus, the pipe dream of a ‘return’ to such a lifestyle is, as 
Newton admits, simply not feasible. 
With these considerations in mind, it may be further argued that 
nonanthropocentrists who succeeded at expunging all vestiges of human-favoring 
biases might be morally obligated to assist in hastening humanity’s extinction since 
humans are so inherently destructive to the biosphere.  Perhaps what ultimately 
prevents a nonanthropocentrist such as Paul Taylor from advocating such misanthropy 
is that his nominally nonanthropocentric axiology limits moral rights to members of 
rational species such as ours.  Like Callicott, Taylor also formulates priority principles 
that conveniently favor humans when it comes to many conflicts of interest.  Taylor 
nevertheless clearly states what many environmentalists imply—that Earth’s biotic 
communities would be better off if humans weren’t around to mess things up for them. 
If, then, the total, final, absolute extermination of our species (by our 
own hands?) should take place and if we should not carry all the others 
with us into oblivion, not only would the Earth’s community of life 
continue to exist, but in all probability its well-being would be enhanced.  
Our presence, in short, is not needed.  If we were to take the standpoint 
of the community and give voice to its true interest, the ending of our six-
inch epoch would most likely be greeted with a hearty “Good riddance!” 
(Taylor 1981:209). 
 
Holmes Rolston has made the similarly misanthropic claim that any human being is 
essentially “a cell of cancerous growth” (Rolston 1996:259) if born into a situation in 
which the carrying capacity of his or her habitat has been exceeded or in which s/he 
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must compete with an endangered species like the black rhinoceros.  If such a human is 
indeed cancerous as Rolston suggests, then surely the diagnosis implies, if not demands, 
a policy of excision.  Of course, since nonanthropocentrists in general avoid adopting the 
misanthropy implied by a genuinely nonanthropocentric worldview but instead 
anthropocentrically favor an Earth that is inhabited by humans—in spite of the 
perceived negative effects of human existence on nature—perhaps their value theories 
should be considered deprecatory attempts at ecological anthropocentrism.   
2.10 A Not-So-Ignorant Intertemporal Rawlsian Veil 
In order to consider what environmental policies would likely be in the interests 
of future generations, one must adopt something analogous to John Rawls' veil of 
ignorance.  Behind the veil, we can determine which present policies are acceptable or 
preferable to individuals in various imaginable futures.  In order to avoid Parfit’s 
paradox, however, Rawls’ veil must allow for the Smilanskian regret that was discussed 
in Chapter One.  Parfit notes that even the most rationally indefensible policies will 
produce future humans who, because they would not have existed if alternate policies 
had been adopted, will consider their lives to be worth living.  It will therefore be in 
their best interests if the policies that facilitated their existence were unchanged.  Of 
course, in Rawls’ original formulation, the veil renders its wearer ignorant of what 
policies may have led to the wearer’s existence.  Rawls’ veil was meant to be a tool for 
deciding upon ethical principles that are fair to all rational beings, regardless of where 
they exist in space-time.  The veil we need is different.  What we seek is a veil that will 
help to create environmental policies that will be endorsed by rational beings of the 
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present and indefinite future.  In Rawls’ formulation of the veil, many of the 
characteristics that could be useful in considering what sorts of environmental policies 
persons should favor have been removed.  Examples are a “conception of the good,” a 
“rational plan of life,” and “information as to which generation they belong” (Rawls 
1999:118).  The veil we require for environmental policy analysis must have less 
ignorance adhering to it.  In the modified Rawlsian intertemporal veil, the 
environmentalists identified by Norton’s convergence hypothesis retain their rationally 
defensible worldviews, which include an ecologically and biologically grounded 
conception of the good, along with a rational plan of life that would necessitate favoring 
considered preferences over felt ones.  Furthermore, the wearers of the veil must 
project themselves into specific imaginable futures and consider what effects on the 
environment have resulted because of currently existing or currently proposed 
environmental policies.  Although it is often stated that we cannot know what future 
humans will want or need from us, we can be extremely close to certain that persons of 
the future will want and need access to clean air, clean water, unpolluted and fertile soil, 
etc.  Thus, there are certain policy decisions that we can safely assume almost all future 
environmentalists would condone, regardless of how far into the future such persons 
are projected.  In order to test the strength of Norton’s convergence hypothesis, we 
should consider whether behind the veil there is convergence regarding the 
environmental policies that would be condemned and condoned by ecological 
anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists.  
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2.11 A Convergence of Smilanskian Regret 
Just as we would not have existed without some horrific events occurring in 
history, future humans cannot have their existence decoupled from the deplorable 
environmental conditions that current humans help bring about.  From behind the 
modified Rawlsian veil, one thing that future environmentalists with rationally 
defensible worldviews will have in common is their moral condemnation of current 
humanity's effect on Earth's ecosystems, biodiversity, rates of species extinction, 
climate change, and so on.  They will undoubtedly provide different reasons for their 
moral condemnation.  Anthropocentrists, for example, will lament the impoverishment 
of the resource base, while nonanthropocentrists will decry the harms done to 
anthropogenically extirpated species and degraded ecosystems.  Nevertheless, they will 
equally consider themselves justified in morally condemning the selfish, short-term 
policies of our generation even if alternative policies would have rendered them 
nonexistent.  As Saul Smilansky suggests, one can test the plausibility of this assumption 
by considering one’s attitudes toward a horrific past event that cannot be decoupled 
from one’s own existence, such as the Holocaust or the practice of slavery in America.  
Insofar as the policies we institute are detrimental to ecosystem stability, biodiversity, 
extinction rates, climate change, and so on, we will give future persons reasons to 
experience Smilanskian regret.  They will regret the deplorable conditions that were 
necessary in order for their existence to become actual.  It will also be the case that, 
even if we act in an environmentally responsible manner, their existence will still be tied 
to the same atrocities of the past that we find regrettable.  Nevertheless, insofar as they 
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condemn what came before us but condone our environmental policies, we at least 
avoid adding to their regrets. 
If ecological anthropocentrists and “reasonable” nonanthropocentrists put on 
the modified Rawlsian veil, they will likely discover that their future counterparts 
converge regarding the environmental policies they would universally condone.  On the 
other hand, we harm ourselves and prevent ourselves from flourishing by engaging in 
actions that are universally construed as morally reprehensible by rational 
environmentalists of the future.  Perhaps here one finds a negative, contextual 
formulation of the categorical imperative.  Instead of morally permissible actions being 
those that proceed according to maxims that would be condoned by all rational beings 
regardless of context, morally permissible actions are those that, considered within their 
contexts, would not be condemned by all rational beings—particularly those beings of 
the distant future who may be in the best position from which to judge current 
environmental policies. 
2.12 Does Norton’s Convergence Hypothesis Make Sense? 
Norton’s convergence hypothesis makes sense if one keeps in mind that it only 
applies to a “sufficiently broad and long-sighted” form of anthropocentrism and a 
“reasonably interpreted,” “consistent,” and “coherent” form of nonanthropocentrism. 
Insofar as most so-called nonanthropocentrists openly promote humanity’s existence 
over its extinction and seek to preserve biospheric stability, biodiversity, and 
ecosystemic health for the good of humans and nonhumans alike, their aims are not 
significantly different from those of ecological anthropocentrists.  Although they may 
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occasionally admit the normative incoherence of biocentric or ecocentric egalitarianism 
or confess that the Earth would be better off without humans, nonanthropocentrists do 
not generally argue that human existence is inherently bad or that humans should 
prefer not to exist.  However, given the impact of Homo sapiens on Earth’s mostly 
nonhuman biota, it is doubtful that a genuinely nonanthropocentric ethic accurately 
gives voice to Earth’s nonhuman interests so long as it advocates our species’ 
continuation over its annihilation.  The distinctions that nonanthropocentrists have 
highlighted between their worldviews and anthropocentrism in general do not apply to 
ecological anthropocentrism.  Ecological anthropocentrism does not base its human-
favoring biases on questionable, pre-Darwinian ontological assumptions regarding 
humanity’s cosmic significance.  Nor does ecological anthropocentrism assume that 
humans or even persons alone can be harmed or are intrinsically valuable.  It is simply 
based on the largely unquestioned belief that a universe in which humans exist is 
preferable to one in which they are extinct. 
Since the foremost requirement for any viable life form to realize a good life is 
for it to have a good environment—one that promotes and ensures the health of the 
species (and not merely the health of the individual organism)—it would seem to follow 
that, if we wish to ensure a better future for humanity, we should at least be as 
concerned for the cumulative effects of our collective behaviors on Earth’s 
environments as we are for their immediate effects on current human populations.  
Because humans are key biotic components of our planet’s biosphere, whatever 
members of our species do to the environment will ultimately impact humanity’s future.  
73 
 
A naturalistic view of Homo sapiens, insofar as it acknowledges the long-term needs of 
our species within the context of its environmental situatedness, evolutionary history, 
and dependence upon other life forms, overtly promotes the adoption of human-
environment interactions that will not overtax or abuse the species, ecosystems, and 
resources needed for future human generations to live well on a geologic scale of time.  
The policies advocated by such a species-embracing anthropocentrism must be good for 
future as well as current humans.  Human livelihoods ultimately depend on stable 
ecosystem processes, which themselves depend on the complex interactions of diverse 
biotic communities scattered around the globe.  If Homo sapiens is to persist as a viable 
species on a geologic scale of time, it will require environmental conditions that are 
conducive to the viability of many nonhuman species as well.  Ecologically 
anthropocentric policies will therefore tend to overlap with those advocated by 
nonanthropocentric thinkers. 
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Chapter Three:  On the Moral Relevance of a Geologic Scale 
3.1 The Limitations of an Individualistic Ethic 
Whether they consider themselves anthropocentrists or nonanthropocentrists, 
environmental thinkers typically agree that orthodox ethical theories are too short-
sighted and individualistic to adequately deal with humanity’s ecological predicament. 
Although a handful of environmentalists retain fundamentally individualistic axiologies, 
most argue that we have (or should have) stronger moral obligations to avoid harming 
species, habitats, communities, ecosystems, and so on than we have to avoid harming 
individuals.  Bryan Norton insists that, in addition to being long-sighted, “an adequate 
environmental ethic is distinctive, not by being necessarily nonanthropocentric as many 
environmental ethicists have argued or assumed, but, rather, by being nonindividualistic” 
(Norton 1984:139).  Traditional ethical frameworks are built upon moral principles that 
are presumed to be universally applicable to all humans, agents, or rational beings, 
regardless of where they exist in space or time.  However, the spatiotemporal scale 
according to which actions are traditionally morally evaluated does not include all such 
beings but is restricted to scales that are experientially relevant to individuals, especially 
those that currently exist.  Given the brevity of a human lifespan, it may seem that the 
actions of any given individual are generally not sufficient to radically alter the 
environment or otherwise greatly impact Homo sapiens’ evolutionary success.  This 
certainly follows if the spatiotemporal scale of moral evaluation is limited to what we as 
individuals can directly experience or affect.  However, anthropogenic mass extinction, 
global warming, and other dystopic features of humanity’s ecological predicament arise 
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from collective human action, with effects that are both spatially and temporally far-
reaching.  Actions that appear benign on a short-term scale, if performed by enough 
individuals across space and time, cross a threshold and turn out to be collectively 
malignant.  Thus, environmentalists emphasize the need to evaluate our actions 
according to not only their individual, immediate effects but also their collective, long-
term impacts.  Humanity’s unchecked exploitation of fossil fuels, for example, generates 
untold benefits for many individuals, but it also leads to acid rain and global warming, 
each with far-reaching, negative ecological consequences. 
Individuals experience life within such tiny slivers of space-time that it is difficult 
for them to comprehend the larger ecological contexts of which they are components.  
From an ecologically anthropocentric perspective, an individual human belongs to a 
series of communities or collectives that are hierarchically nested, the most important 
of which is Homo sapiens.  Nonanthropocentrically, the most important collective is the 
community of life or the biosphere.  Although individuals and the communities to which 
they belong have highly variable patterns of consumption, with correspondingly variable 
impacts on the environment, humanity’s current overall population size, resource 
utilization, and global dispersal place Homo sapiens among life forms, such as insects 
and microbes, that leave a genuinely global footprint.  As Craig Dilworth notes, “The 
human population is ‘swarming;’ we are behaving like an r-selected species” (Dilworth 
2010:374).  R-selected species, or r-strategists, opportunistically fill available niches as a 
result of their fecundity and the rapid dispersal of their offspring.  Such a species’ 
‘strategy’ is for its members to produce as many offspring as possible so that enough of 
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them will survive whatever unpredictable selection pressures they face and continue 
the cycle of mass reproduction.  Although individual humans certainly do not reproduce 
at the rate of individual r-strategists, Dilworth’s observation concerns the fact that since 
the industrial revolution humans have collectively reproduced and dispersed at 
exponentially increasing rates.  Satellite images of the Earth at night reveal the extent to 
which humans have infiltrated the globe.  The artificial lights of human habitations wrap 
around the planet like glowing impact craters.  If we could see time-lapse satellite 
images of the Earth over the last couple of centuries, humanity’s global swarming would 
look eerily similar to the explosive growth of a bacterial colony within a Petri dish.  This 
sort of observation has led some environmentalists, such as Holmes Rolston, to label 
humanity as pathogenic.  Given humanity’s influence on Earth’s long-standing biotic 
communities, its function within ecosystems seems to be that of an infestation. 
 I have argued in the preceding chapters that despite widespread 
acknowledgement among nonanthropocentrists that Earth’s “well-being would be 
enhanced” (Taylor 1981:209) if the “cancerous growth” of humanity (Rolston 1996:259) 
were excised, such thinkers nevertheless converge with anthropocentrists by exhibiting 
a preference for “our world (with us in it!)” (Callicott 1984:304).  As demonstrated in 
Chapter One, nonanthropocentrists typically would not be willing to restore the 
biosphere to its ‘natural’ state of integrity, stability, and beauty if, as seems likely, it 
required our species’ extinction.  Recall Norton’s insistence that this implies an 
acceptance of the Axiom of Future Value (AFV):   
The continuance and thriving of the human species (and its evolutionary 
successors) is a good thing, and every generation is obliged to do what is 
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necessary to perpetuate that good.  The obligation to perpetuate and 
protect the human species is therefore accepted as a fundamental moral 
axiom, which exists independently of obligations to individuals (Norton 
1991:216). 
 
Individual humans are not points of singularity but are fundamentally inseparable from 
their species and the nested hierarchies of various communities, purely human and 
mixed human-nonhuman, to which they belong and without which they could not exist.  
A short-sighted anthropocentrist or nonanthropocentrist could reject the AFV and argue 
that the only morally relevant hierarchies are those that exist in the present.  However, 
any rationally defensible ideology that champions the interests, preferences, and values 
of a species must expand its concerns to encompass all the species’ members rather 
than those that are specifically identifiable—i.e., individuals currently or imminently 
existing.  Taking into account the interests, preferences, and values of a species also 
requires an appropriate valuation of the ecological conditions that promote its long-
term evolutionary success.  Since the evolutionary success of Homo sapiens and other 
megabiotic species that environmentalists are keen to protect can be roughly measured 
according to their persistence in the geologic record, environmentalists should call for 
human actions to be morally evaluated within the larger context of a geologic 
spatiotemporal scale.  Individual and collective actions that are foreseeably detrimental 
to the long-term stability of “the resource base” (Norton 1984:143) are also those that 
jeopardize the evolutionary success of all extant species.  If human actions are evaluated 
on scales that are short-sighted and individualistic, most humans are essentially 
blameless for their role in facilitating the anthropogenic ecological predicament facing 
Earth’s present and future beings. 
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3.2 Can a Geologic Scale Be Morally Relevant? 
Although environmentalists are critical of the individualistic spatiotemporal 
scales according to which actions have been traditionally appraised by moral 
philosophers, they generally claim, as does anthropocentrist William Grey, that a 
geologic scale “is not relevant for reflections about (or the regulation of) human conduct” 
(Grey 1993:467).  Grey claims that: 
If we attempt to step too far outside the scale of the recognizably human, 
rather than expanding and enriching our moral horizons we render them 
meaningless, or at least almost unrecognizable.  The grand perspective of 
evolutionary biology provides a reductio ad absurdum of the cluster of 
nonanthropocentric ethics which can be found under the label 'deep 
ecology'.  What deep ecology seeks to promote, and what deep 
ecologists seek to condemn, needs to be articulated from a distinctively 
human perspective.  And this is more than the trivial claim that our 
perspectives, values and judgements are necessarily human perspectives, 
values and judgements (ibid.:463—464). 
Grey argues that temporal extension of moral concern “is intelligible only as long as it 
relates to a scale which is recognizably human, and to that extent, anthropocentric.  . . .  
But that should lead us to extend our concern over centuries, rather than years or 
decades” (ibid.:467).  Grey assumes that if one adopts a geologic scale to morally 
evaluate humanity’s effects on the environment, they will be viewed indifferently.  After 
all, regardless of how many species humans extinguish or how many habitats they toxify, 
given enough time, nature will ‘bounce back’ as it has repeatedly done in the geologic 
past following cataclysmic mass extinction events.  Nevertheless, perhaps only a 
nonanthropocentrist who embraces what J. Baird Callicott terms holistic rationalism 
would exhibit stoic indifference regarding this fact.  Those who instead embrace the AFV 
have grounds for strongly condemning the short-sighted overexploitation of natural 
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resources that otherwise could have sustained our species and enabled it to flourish for 
several million years to come. 
Grey’s argument against the moral relevance of a geologic scale is echoed by 
Callicott, whose amendment to Leopold’s land ethic reads, “A thing is right when it 
tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales.  It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise” (Callicott 1999:138).  For Callicott, biotic disturbances 
are “normal” if the spatial and temporal scales involved are, as Grey puts it, 
“recognizably human,” spanning centuries.  Like Grey, Callicott assumes that utilizing a 
geologic spatiotemporal scale to morally evaluate human actions ultimately leads to 
indifference regarding the current state of the biosphere.  Callicott believes that this 
indifference can only be avoided if we limit ourselves to maintaining what is ecologically 
normal in the present. 
Our moral obligations—engendered by our community memberships, 
human and biospheric—are delimited by a fairly circumscribed temporal 
scale.  The geological temporal scale is not morally meaningful.  . . .  Our 
duty is to preserve the species populations of the biotic communities that 
exist now.  How to define the specious present indicated by the word 
now?  We must build into it room for change; the world is not static.  But 
if not the geological scale, upon what scale is it appropriate morally to 
evaluate change?  An ecological scale, I suggest, calibrated by such 
ecological processes as disturbance regimes and succession (Callicott 
2002:297). 
 
However, Callicott’s conception of ecological-scale normalcy does not seem to account 
for the fact that until quite recently, extinctions occurred on a geologic scale rather than 
on an ecological one.  Furthermore, normal rates of disturbance and succession cannot 
be adequately determined unless a geologic scale is utilized.  Disturbances and 
successions that appear normal over a handful of centuries may be construed as 
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abnormal if contrasted with those that occur on a much more expansive timescale.  
When it comes to environmental ethics, if moral obligations are inextricably associated 
with the concept of ecological normalcy, as Callicott insists, then a geologic scale is 
relevant to moral evaluations and is thus “morally meaningful” for at least helping to 
specify appropriate moral concerns—particularly regarding extinctions.   
In order to understand what sorts of changes to an ecosystem or the biosphere 
are normal, such changes must be compared to and contrasted with the patterns 
ascertained from the geologic record.  Biologist Michael McKinney explains: 
Comparison of current human impacts on the biosphere to diversity 
patterns in the fossil record is essential for conservation biology.  
Without some kind of natural baseline, it is impossible to understand the 
radical changes being made to our current biosphere by humans.  
Examples of crucial baseline parameters include extinction rates, rates of 
biotic interchange, extinction selectivity (which taxa are more extinction-
prone) during background and mass extinctions, and recovery patterns 
following mass extinctions (McKinney 2005:119). 
 
If we had no knowledge of the normal rates at which species have gone extinct in the 
geologic past, we would not be so alarmed at the current, abnormal rate of 
anthropogenic extinctions.  Such knowledge seems to justify environmentalists’ sense of 
its wrongness.  The ecological scale advocated by both Grey and Callicott would have us 
evaluate normalcy on a timescale that covers only a handful of centuries since that is 
the timeframe during which disturbance regimes and succession normally take place.  
Even if we generously extended Callicott’s ecological timescale to encompass a handful 
of millennia, that would not be a sufficient amount of time to register the difference 
between the rate of anthropogenic extinctions and the normal background rate.  The 
geologic record strongly suggests that humans have been extinguishing species at an 
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abnormally high rate for the past 50,000 to 70,000 years.  In order to determine how 
ecologically abnormal and thus, from Callicott’s perspective, morally wrong the rate of 
anthropogenic mass extinctions is, we must adopt a timescale that encompasses 
millions of years.  Besides, species such as ours typically persist for several million years.  
Paleontologist Michael Benton explains:   
Extinction is normal.  Species do not last forever.  Indeed, the average 
lifespan of a species is perhaps 5 myr., with a range from 100,000 years 
to 15 myr., depending on what you are, whether a microbe or a flowering 
plant.  Species come and go and, even though the overall diversity of life 
still seems to be increasing, there is a steady rate of background, or 
normal, extinction.  The background rate of extinction may be only 10 to 
20% of species per million years—10 or 20 species out of every 100 
disappear every million years, which translates to one or two species per 
100 every 100,000 years (Benton 2003:135). 
 
 Since the geologic record indicates that anatomically modern humans have only existed 
for about 200,000 years, our tenure on the planet may have only begun.  However, if we 
are to go on existing for the several million years that would seemingly be normal for a 
species such as ours, we must recognize the importance of indefinitely maintaining a 
stable resource base.  Among other things, this entails that we must stop degrading 
habitats and extirpating species at abnormally high rates.  As Grey correctly notes: 
A suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral 
part of larger systems – that is, correcting the misconception of humanity 
as distinct and separate from the natural world – means that 
anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to 
concern for the nonhuman world.  If we value ourselves and our projects, 
and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations 
will be transmitted to the world (Grey 1993:466). 
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3.3 Are Determinations of Ecological Normalcy Arbitrary? 
Without a larger context to serve as a frame of reference, determinations of 
ecological normalcy are essentially based on scales confined to what individual humans 
can directly observe over no more than a small handful of generations.  However, basing 
ecological normalcy on such a limited perspective can lead to conservation and 
preservation policies that are questionably arbitrary.  The species and ecological 
communities that have occupied a geographic region the longest, as evident from 
geologic and paleoecological data, should be considered the most normal or natural for 
that general location.  Environmental policies aimed at maintaining such species and 
communities in their ‘natural’ state should thus be far-sighted in terms of conservation, 
preservation, or restoration.  As Paul and Hazel Delcourt explain, however, this has not 
been the case in the United States.  
The United States federal government mandates that wilderness areas 
and old-growth forests be restored and maintained in their “natural 
condition,” defined as that which existed in preColumbian times (before 
European American contact in the late 1400s), and therefore supposedly 
in a condition that was previously unaffected by human activities.  This 
land management policy reflects the widely held notion that activities of 
prehistoric Native Americans were an insignificant ecological factor 
(Delcourt and Delcourt 2004:7). 
The widespread notion that the vegetation the pioneers saw represented 
the “potential natural vegetation,” that is, the vegetation that would 
regenerate in the absence of human influence, became the basis for 
guidelines to conserve representative remnants of natural vegetation as 
well as for efforts to restore altered vegetation to its natural state 
(ibid.:163). 
By 200 BP, the landscapes that were previously utilized extensively by 
Native Americans had been abandoned and had largely regenerated as 
late-successional ecosystems.  By the time that most Europeans saw 
them, the landscapes of eastern North America appeared to be a 
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wilderness.  Rather than the forest primeval, however, the vegetation 
was composed of secondary stands that had regrown during just one 
successional cycle after Native American abandonment (ibid.:163—164). 
 
Nowhere on Earth does the biosphere remain static.  As Callicott insists, one 
must allow for disturbances and succession when determining the normal composition 
of biotic communities.  It is also important to understand how ecological disturbances 
and successions have helped shape the communities under consideration.  From a 
broad spatiotemporal perspective, it is clear that the biota that inhabits any particular 
space on the planet is constantly in flux as a result of factors such as climate change and 
variations in resource availability, although there are also indications that certain areas 
are more ‘natural’ for some species than others.  Paleoecological, paleontological and 
archaeological studies also indicate that humans have left an indelible mark in the 
geologic record for at least the past 50,000 to 70,000 years.  When Homo sapiens left 
Africa and Eurasia, its dispersal into novel territories invariably led to widespread 
ecological disturbances and rates of extinction exponentially higher than the geologic, 
pre-human, background rates that had been normal for millions of years.  The biotic 
communities of the Americas, for example, have been utterly transformed by humans 
over at least the past 13 millennia.  In 1492, “the overall population densities may have 
been as high as those of much of fifteenth-century Europe” (ibid.:163).  The layout of 
plant and animal communities just prior to European contact was the result of the land’s 
adaptation to its human inhabitants (who themselves were adapting to the land) and 
bore little resemblance to the ‘unspoiled’ wilderness seen by the first humans to arrive 
there.  When human population densities were low, Pleistocene megafaunal 
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communities thrived.  Nonanthropocentrically speaking, the ecosystems were ‘healthy’ 
and fairly stable, at least for the long periods of time between ice ages.  According to 
Paul Martin’s overkill hypothesis, the first humans that entered the Americas hunted 
most of the large animals to their extinction, one after another.   
Around the time Clovis points and other prehistoric artifacts first 
appeared, two-thirds of the large animals of North America north of 
Mexico suffered explosive extinction.  Mexico, Central, and South 
America lost even more, including commensals and parasites that 
disappeared with their hosts (Martin 2005:51). 
 
At some point, however, humans began to become integrated in a less destructive 
manner, perhaps having learned to conserve the animals that were important resources 
to them.  At any rate, indigenous peoples had learned to take advantage of the land and 
selectively managed the forests, plains and riparian zones to promote an abundance of 
various plants and animals that could be used for food, shelter, trade, and so on.  
However, soon after the established human populations were decimated (perhaps to 
10% of their peak size) by the post-Columbian newcomers, the land’s successional 
trajectories were greatly altered once again by humans—by the sudden absence of the 
former human inhabitants and the abrupt presence of new ones.  Of course, the land is 
still in a state of potential disequilibrium, its stability made more fluid by anthropogenic 
shifts in climate and the constant anthropogenic introduction of invasive species, the 
chief of which is Homo sapiens itself.  It would thus seem that there is no way to ‘return’ 
the land to its “natural condition” as long as it is inhabited by humans.  However, the 
geologic record may help to inform less arbitrary decisions regarding what state of 
nature we might feasibly ‘stabilize.’ 
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If one accepts Norton’s Axiom of Future Value or a reasonably interpreted 
nonanthropocentric version (as discussed in Chapter Two), one must acknowledge the 
moral relevance of a geologic spatiotemporal scale.  By limiting our moral responsibility 
to the handful of centuries called for by Callicott’s or Grey’s ecological timescale, we 
deny both the ecological impacts our species’ behaviors have had in the geologic past as 
well as the impacts they will have in the indefinite future on the evolutionary trajectory 
of humans, nonhumans and the biosphere itself.  The ecological impacts of 
anthropogenic disturbances such as global warming, biotic homogenization, invasional 
meltdown, and mass extinction may be hard to discern from a slowly unfolding scale 
that is “recognizably human,” but the persistence of these impacts will be as enormous 
on a geologic spatiotemporal scale as those that accompanied the five greatest mass 
extinction events of the past 600 million years.  While it is also true that on a geologic 
scale, new species will eventually emerge after the anthropogenic extinction event, and 
biodiversity will likely even surpass pre-extinction-event levels as has been the case with 
many past mass extinction events, this will happen long after humans and the species 
they care about preserving have gone extinct (as a result of unavoidably destructive 
cosmic or geologic events).  This fact does not alter the relevance of a geologic scale, 
however.  If policies are to truly favor the long-term preservation of species that exist 
now, as Callicott, Grey and other environmentalists insist, they must be informed by a 
consideration of patterns that have occurred throughout the geologic past.  It is at the 
geologic scale that a species’ evolutionary success and its long-term environmental 
needs are most apparent, including the ecosystem processes upon which its survival or 
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flourishing likely depends.  The continued existence of endangered species in the wild 
(as opposed to in zoos) may be short-lived if policies do not aim at conserving or 
preserving them for millennia rather than centuries.  Along these lines, Martin argues 
that we could save elephants (and other endangered animals) from extinction by 
‘returning’ these proxy species to the Americas. 
Introduction of both Asian and African elephants could . . . restart the 
evolution of proboscideans in the New World, where a dozen species 
held sway for more than 15 million years before their demise ended long-
established ecological relationships and evolutionary possibilities.  The 
claim of these giants to an evolutionary future is no less valid than our 
own.  We can enable them to reinvent their ecology on the continent 
that once constituted an important part of their global range (ibid.:209). 
Martin’s proposed rewilding project aims at ‘restoring’ (as far as possible) the “natural 
conditions” that were disrupted by humans during the late Pleistocene.  While this 
conception of nature may seem, on a geologic scale, less arbitrary than that of the US 
federal government, the ‘restored’ species would be strangers in a strange land.  The 
ultimate effect of introduced elephants on any remaining species from the Pleistocene 
is unclear since these proxy species never existed in the Americas.  Nevertheless, Martin 
may be correct that such a project would best promote the evolutionary success of 
proboscideans since they are so endangered in their ‘native’ lands.   
3.4 An Appeal to Ignorance 
The nature of our relationship to humans of the distant future is complicated by, 
among other things, the amount of ignorance we possess regarding the ecological, 
social, political, cultural, and economic conditions that will be in place.  Of course, the 
more remote the future, the less certain are our predictions.  Perhaps a safe, clean, 
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inexpensive, sustainable energy source will replace fossil fuels, and scientists will find a 
way to reverse the effects of fossil fuels on the environment.  Maybe scientists will 
discover an inexpensive desalination method that produces no toxic waste.  It might 
also be that a superbug wipes out 95% of the human population, drastically reducing 
humanity’s collective ecological footprint.  If any of these possibilities occurred, many 
essential elements of expected ecological dystopias would be avoided.  As mentioned 
earlier, there is also a degree of arbitrariness involved in selecting a state of nature for 
preservation since ecosystems are under constant revision.  And, as Martin Gorke points 
out, universal consensus is not likely to ever exist among humans regarding which 
particular ecological conditions are preferable.  Thus, it may seem incredibly naïve for 
environmentalists to presume to know what sorts of environmental policies humans of 
the distant future might consider to have been ideal for themselves or for nonhumanity.     
Anthropocentric naturalism is no less illusionary than naturalism that 
encompasses all species.  Just as different species have different interests 
in an ecosystem, we must also expect various ideas from different people 
concerning the ecological conditions in which they would prefer to live.  
Is it “for humans” most favorable to live in a wild primal forest, a 
landscape characterized by small farms, streamlined agricultural areas or 
(as it is so euphemistically phrased) a “flourishing industrial landscape”?  
It seems obvious that this question can neither be answered by referring 
exclusively to ecological relationships nor can an answer be found in a 
universally accepted manner (Gorke 2003:57). 
 
Despite our ignorance of an ecological condition universally acceptable for humanity, I 
argued in Chapter Two that a not-so-ignorant intertemporal Rawlsian veil tempered 
with considerations of Smilanskian regret could be used to evaluate people’s future 
attitudes regarding current environmental policies.  As long as humanity’s minimal vital 
interests—such as unpolluted air, soil, and water, stable ecosystem processes, and so 
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on—are indefinitely protected, it is not necessary that every human adopt the same 
lifestyle or live in the same ecological conditions.   
Ecologically grounded anthropocentrism must allow for a pluralistic conception 
of humanity’s good that permits variation in lifestyles and social organizations but 
condemns individual or collective behaviors that are immediately or foreseeably 
detrimental to species and biotic communities that environmentalists with rationally 
defensible worldviews want to conserve or preserve.  Behaviors must be appraised 
within their contexts.  Norton explains what sorts of policies would follow from this 
approach: 
The contextual approach to environmental management recognizes 
constraints based in the dynamic interplay between specific actions (such 
as use of CFCs in aerosols or continued unrestrained use of fossil fuels) 
and the larger, normally slower-changing context in which those 
decisions are implemented.  According to contextualism, there exists a 
threshold within which individual decisions to use CFC aerosols or burn 
fossil fuels will have insignificant impacts on the larger environmental 
context, which in these cases we can understand as the atmospheric 
envelope surrounding the earth.  The atmosphere has significant 
resilience and can damp out consequences of the activities in question up 
to some point; if, however, major and persistent trends over several 
generations (such as accelerating use of fossil fuels since the onset of the 
industrial revolution) continue indefinitely, the atmospheric threshold is 
exceeded, and the autonomous and slow-changing characteristics of the 
atmosphere can undergo rapid change, such as changes in temperature 
many times more rapid than those that would normally occur with the 
advance and recession of the ice ages.  According to this reasoning, 
activities that threaten no thresholds raise no ethical questions—they 
can be decided freely by individuals on the basis of choice (Norton 
1991:210). 
 
 We may be ignorant of humanity’s future technological capacities, but we can be 
fairly certain of many of the environmental challenges that future humans will face as a 
result of anthropogenic factors like global warming, pollution, and the disruption of 
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ecosystem processes.  The most daunting challenges will likely be due to rising sea levels 
because of global warming and the resulting loss of habitable and arable land as well as 
fresh water supplies.  Indeed, many nations will be utterly submerged, and their human 
and nonhuman inhabitants will become environmental refugees.  Another challenge 
that current generations have taken all too lightly concerns the storage of high-level 
nuclear waste from nuclear reactors.  When nuclear energy was still an emerging 
technology, the U.S. Geological Survey warned of the potential dangers of its waste 
products to future humans because of “the uncertainties involved in geologic prediction 
for long timespans” (Abbotts 1979:13).   
Earth scientists can indicate which sites have been relatively stable in the 
geologic past, but they cannot guarantee future stability.  Construction of 
a repository and emplacement of waste will initiate complex processes 
that cannot, at present, be predicted with certainty (ibid.:13). 
 
The concerns expressed by Nobel laureate physicist Hannes Alfvén are also no less 
relevant today. 
The problem is how to keep radioactive waste in storage until it decays 
after hundreds of thousands of years.  The deposit must be absolutely 
reliable as the quantities of poison are tremendous.  It is very difficult to 
satisfy these requirements for the simple reason that we have had no 
practical experience with such a long term project.  Moreover 
permanently guarded storage requires a society with unprecedented 
stability (ibid.:14). 
 
If we currently have the capacity to lessen the severity of such challenges but willfully 
neglect to do so, our descendants will hold us accountable.  It would be highly 
irresponsible for us to ignore these challenges on the assumption that future human 
societies will develop the technology to adequately deal with them.  Although we may 
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appeal to ignorance, such appeals will make us no less responsible for the all-too-real 
ecological predicament we carelessly dump at the feet of future humans. 
3.5 A Personalist’s Appeal to Ignorance – Regarding Parfit's Paradox 
According to the person-affecting intuition discussed in Chapter Two, in order for 
harms or benefits to be morally relevant, they must affect persons.  As pointed out by 
Derek Parfit, since our actions can only directly affect particular (identifiable) persons, 
the person-affecting intuition implies that the moral relevance of our actions can only 
be relative to those persons currently living or immediately foreseeable through 
impending births.7  Thus, adopting a morally responsible attitude toward persons of the 
distant future is an illogical exercise in futility.  Although any persons that exist in the 
distant future will partially owe their existence to current policies and practices, such 
persons are fundamentally unidentifiable and can only be indirectly affected by what 
current humans do or fail to do.  Coupling the person-affecting principle with the 
nonidentity problem, Parfit notes that after a few generations no matter what 
environmental policies we choose, whether conservation or depletion of natural 
resources, no identifiable persons will be harmed or helped by our actions.  If any 
persons come to exist in the distant future and prefer existence over nonexistence, then, 
since our policies and practices are causally necessary for their existence, whatever we 
do or fail to do must be somehow inherently good for them.  Paradoxically, even the 
disabilities or other misfortunes that future persons may experience as a result of our 
7 Of course, some personalists do not consider potential persons, such as fetuses or infants, to be 
members of the moral community and argue that such beings cannot be harmed.  Alberto Giubilini and 
Francesca Minerva (2013), for example, apply this reasoning to argue in favor of infanticide, regardless of 
an infant’s health or future prospects. 
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environmental policies can be viewed as ultimately propitious since if our policies had 
been otherwise, they would not have existed at all.  As noted by William Ferraiolo 
(2000), only those fortunate enough to exist in the first place can be subject to 
misfortunes of any kind.   
According to the personalist’s appeal to ignorance, since future persons cannot 
be harmed by what we do or fail to do, it seems that any environmental policy—even 
one that calls for the frivolous and utter depletion of resources that would be of vital 
interest to anyone who might exist beyond a couple of generations—is morally 
permissible as long as it causes no harms to currently existing persons.  This led Parfit to 
conclude that the person-affecting intuition should be rejected.  Parfit's dismissal is 
based on a more deeply felt, nonpersonal, human-affecting intuition that recognizes 
harms to humanity regardless of whether the recipients of such harms are readily 
identifiable or not.  Because the person-affecting intuition is inherently individualistic, 
its spatiotemporal scale is too narrowly confined to adequately deal with long-term 
environmental problems such as global warming or mass extinction that affect collective 
humanity.  If we radically decrease the potential quality of life for future humans 
through the overuse of limited or toxic resources, and thereby constrain humanity’s 
long-term evolutionary success, we should recognize the harms that are committed and 
acknowledge our role in instigating them.  If we cause future persons to regard us with 
contempt (for filling them with Smilanskian regret, perhaps), we also preclude any 
possibility of having what Aristotle deemed flourishing, or excellent, lives.  As Thomas 
Nagel explains: 
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There are goods and evils which are irreducibly relational; they are 
features of the relations between a person, with spatial and temporal 
boundaries of the usual sort, and circumstances which may not coincide 
with him either in space or in time.  A man’s life includes much that does 
not transpire within the boundaries of his body and his mind, and what 
happens to him can include much that does not take place within the 
boundaries of his life.  These boundaries are commonly crossed by the 
misfortunes of being deceived, or despised, or betrayed (Nagel 1970:77—
78). 
It is likely that if current human societies do not significantly alter their environmental 
policies, the ecological legacy we hand over to future humans will be received with a 
strong sense of condemnation.  If we continue to frivolously deplete toxic and limited 
resources, extirpate species, and so on, without adequately considering the long-term 
effects, future generations will condemn us as egoistic villains, or moral monsters.  The 
longer into the future the effects of our ecological irresponsibility persist, the more 
monstrous we will appear to our descendants.  Since the person-affecting intuition 
would lead us to egoistically disregard such concerns, it cannot be the basis for a 
coherent environmental ethic.   
3.6 Individuals as Complicit Participants in Collective Wrongdoing 
Although humans have had significant impacts on the biosphere for millennia, 
the most radical changes have coincided with the population explosion that began with 
the industrial revolution.  One of the consequences of humanity’s exponential 
population growth is an increasingly diluted sense of responsibility among individuals 
for the effects of their actions on others who are spatially or temporally remote.  Craig 
Dilworth notes: 
Just as the money economy subverted many of the values of simpler 
societies, so did population growth. . . .  The excessive increase in the size 
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of human groups, by diluting the socially harmful consequences of 
immoral actions among millions of untouched and distant individuals, has 
allowed immorality to become less easily recognisable than it was in 
small primitive groups, in which all the members knew each other and 
promptly recognized the actions that could menace the survival of their 
communities (Dilworth 2010:374). 
 
When we participate in the large behavioral trends of human societies, such as the 
frivolous mass consumption of fossil fuels, we are accomplices to the harms that occur 
as a result of our collective actions.  We consider ourselves to be beyond reproach, 
however, because our individual contributions to the effects of collective action seem 
too miniscule to be relevant.  Christopher Kutz argues that two commonsense principles 
are implicit in most defenses of the individual’s nonresponsibility for harms committed 
in cases of collective action:  the Individual Difference Principle and the Control Principle. 
Individual Difference Principle:  (Basis) I am accountable for a harm only 
if what I have done made a difference to that harm's occurrence.  
(Object) I am accountable only for the difference my action alone makes 
to the resulting state of affairs (Kutz 2000:116). 
 
Control Principle:  (Basis) I am accountable for a harm's occurrence only 
if I could control its occurrence, by producing or preventing it.  (Object) I 
am accountable only for those harms over whose occurrence I had 
control (ibid.:116—117). 
 
In the case of fossil fuels, the above principles imply that the average consumer 
cannot be held accountable for any of the harms associated with their mass 
consumption.  For instance, if humanity’s widespread consumption of fossil fuels is 
primarily to blame for global warming, it would still take place even if any particular 
extant individual had never existed.  The average consumer has no control over whether 
or not anthropogenic global warming is taking place.  Nor does his or her isolated 
consumption of fossil fuels make any practical difference to the severity of global 
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warming.  Nevertheless, Kutz argues, another commonsense principle, the Principle of 
Complicity, overrides the other two principles in making the individual at least partially 
responsible for collective-action harms.  
The Complicity Principle:  (Basis) I am accountable for what others do 
when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or harm they cause.  
(Object) I am accountable for the harm or wrong we do together, 
independently of the actual difference I make (ibid.:122). 
 
Intentional participation in this context is perhaps better described as voluntary 
participation.  When we freely engage in collective actions that produce harms, we are 
complicit regardless of what goals or motives are associated with our actions.  Kutz also 
recognizes that, while many of us complicitly produce collective-action harms and are 
thus morally blameworthy, we do not all share the same culpability.  Individuals’ moral 
guilt from complicit participation in collective action runs along a continuum, with the 
least culpable peripheral agents at one end and the most blameworthy core agents at 
the other.  Peripheral agents are less aware of the harms that will result from the 
collective action they participate in, or, knowing about such harms, they are less willing 
to participate.  Core agents, on the other hand, are more aware of the harms that will 
result from the collective action they participate in, and they are more willing to 
participate.  It is not the direct consequences of an individual’s actions that matter.  As 
David Schwartz explains, what morally matters according to the Complicity Principle is 
that an agent “intentionally participates in—and thereby adopts the ends of—the 
collectivity that together commits the wrongdoing” (Schwartz 2010:72, emphasis added).  
It should also be pointed out that perhaps more often than not, the ends, or 
consequences, are implicitly rather than explicitly adopted by both the individuals 
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involved and the collective itself.  Consider, for example, an individual who takes a 
shortcut through the grass instead of using the sidewalk.  If enough individuals 
collectively take the shortcut, the lawn will be ‘destroyed.’  Beyond a certain threshold, 
any given individual who participates in the collective action will have no significant 
effect on the end, or consequence, of the collective action.  Nevertheless, each 
individual who voluntarily participates is complicit for implicitly adopting the 
collectivity’s end, which in this case is the ‘destruction’ of the lawn, despite the fact that, 
for argument’s sake, not one of the individuals wishes to ‘destroy’ the lawn.  It does not 
matter that the explicit intention of each individual may be to get where s/he is going 
more quickly.  The key points are that each individual who takes the shortcut likely 
knows that the shortcut will ‘destroy’ the lawn and that each individual could have used 
the sidewalk instead. 
 In modern, globalized consumer societies, almost every aspect of daily life is 
heavily dependent on the consumption of fossil fuels, and virtually no one is ignorant of 
the ecological degradations associated with such consumption.  Although it is likely that 
most consumers are aware that the collective consumption of fossil fuels will have 
negative ecological consequences, it is also highly likely that they do not wish such 
consequences to result from their behaviors.  One may then claim that since they do not 
intend to bring about negative consequences, consumers are blameless.  However, it is 
not the intended consequences of one’s actions that matter according to the Complicity 
Principle but one’s voluntary participation in a collective activity that has (or will have) 
negative or harmful consequences.  Consumers share moral culpability since they 
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voluntarily participate in the mass consumption of fossil fuels in spite of having at least 
some knowledge about the negative effects of such consumption.  They also have the 
freedom, however utterly inconvenient it may be, to avoid consuming fossil fuels—or at 
least to drastically reduce the amount of fossil fuels that they participate in consuming. 
Among those at the core of blameworthiness, however, are many of the executives of 
fossil fuel companies and automobile manufacturers, along with the politicians 
responsible for lax mileage and emissions standards.  Such individuals are integral to 
facilitating an increase in the frivolous consumption of fossil fuels rather than their 
reduction or replacement with less harmful alternatives. 
3.7 On the Moral Irrelevance of Spatial and Temporal Proximity 
One point of convergence among environmentalists is their concern to avoid 
what they consider radically dystopic futures.  Although nonanthropocentrists 
emphasize our obligations to indefinitely avoid harming nonhumanity, they typically 
express the same concern as anthropocentrists to maintain a biosphere that is 
hospitable to human flourishing as well.  Of course, one does not have to look to the 
distant future in order to find humans living in dystopic situations.  There are plenty of 
people in the world today without access to clean drinking water or reliable food 
sources, who must contend with disease, warfare, or extreme poverty.  Although we, 
the relatively affluent, are aware of their existence and could very easily offer assistance 
to some of them, we do not consider ourselves morally blameworthy if we choose not 
to.  Perhaps this is because the number of sufferers is so great that our individual 
contributions of time or money would only affect a tiny fraction of them.  As Bernard 
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Williams puts it, “It is not an accident or a limitation or a prejudice that we cannot care 
equally about all the suffering in the world:  it is a condition of our existence and our 
sanity” (Williams 2006:147).  Peter Singer and James Rachels argue from utilitarian 
humanism that we are nevertheless morally culpable since we are able but unwilling to 
help at least some of them.  According to the moderate version8 of Singer’s Principle of 
Preventing Bad Occurrences: 
If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, 
morally, to do it.  . . .  It makes no moral difference whether the person I 
can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name 
I shall never know, ten thousand miles away (Singer 1972:231—232). 
Both Singer and Rachels challenge the legitimacy of our culturally-ingrained 
intuitions about obligations to fellow humans based on factors like spatial proximity. 
Although in the past it would have required great sacrifices of time or money to help 
those who are geographically distant, globalization and modern technology have 
rendered spatial proximity irrelevant.  Now, via telephone or computer, we can instantly 
donate to local or international aid organizations working to alleviate the suffering of 
fellow humans.  Spatial proximity is thus not a morally significant factor, although it is 
helpful in predicting our behavior.  Rachels explains: 
It is absurd to suppose that being located at a certain map co-ordinate 
entitles one to treatment which one would not merit if situated at a 
different longitude or latitude.  Of course, if a dying person's location 
meant that we could not help, that would excuse us (Rachels 1979:161). 
8 I will not discuss the strong version of the principle because it seems “to require reducing ourselves to 
the level of marginal utility,” which is “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering 
to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift” (Singer 1972:241).  Although Singer prefers the 
strong version, it can be rejected on the grounds that it would require its adherents to qualify for 
sainthood.  The moderate version does not require such radical sacrifices. 
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The location of the starving people does make a difference, 
psychologically, in how we feel.  If there were a starving child in the same 
room with us, we could not avoid realizing, in a vivid and disturbing way, 
how it is suffering and that it is about to die.  Faced with this realization 
our consciences probably would not allow us to ignore the child.  But if 
the dying are far away, it is easy to think of them only abstractly, or to 
put them out of our thoughts altogether (ibid.:161). 
   
Rachels goes further by challenging another basic intuition.  According to Rachels’ 
Equivalence Thesis, there are no moral distinctions between killing and letting die.  If it 
is wrong to actively kill someone, it is equally wrong to passively allow someone to die 
who could have a life worth living and whose life could be saved by our actions. 
Some philosophers have argued that letting people die is not as bad as 
killing them, because in general our 'positive duty' to give aid is weaker 
than our 'negative duty' not to do harm.  I maintain the opposite:  letting 
die is just as bad as killing.  At first this may seem wildly implausible.  
When reminded that people are dying of starvation while we spend 
money on trivial things, we may feel a bit guilty, but certainly we do not 
feel like murderers.  Whether this feature of 'our moral system' is 
rationally defensible is, however, another matter (ibid.:159). 
 
Arguing by a similar analogy, Singer points out that if it is wrong for us to ignore a child 
drowning in a shallow pond when it is in our power to save the child, it is also wrong for 
us to allow fellow humans to starve to death when we can easily do something to save 
them.  No supererogatory acts are required on our part.  By simply foregoing a frivolous 
act of participation in consumer society, such as purchasing a bag of potato chips or a 
cup of coffee, and instead donating the unused money to a charity, we could help 
extend another human’s life, even if only temporarily.  The temporary status of such aid 
is also irrelevant.  Imagine that Pandi (the pandimensional being introduced in Chapter 
One) informs us that in saving the drowning child in Singer’s analogy, we could extend 
his or her life by only a few hours, since the child will die of unrelated, unavoidable 
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natural causes the next day.  Such knowledge would not, morally speaking, give us free 
reign to ignore the child’s immediate plight.  On a geologic scale, human lives are so 
brief that any extension, whether measured in days or in decades, prolongs the 
inevitable outcome of death by only a trivial margin of time.  Nevertheless, because the 
child in Singer’s example is deemed to have a life worth living, however brief it may 
ultimately be, Singer argues that we are morally obligated to at least consider the child’s 
vital interests and do what we can to protect those interests. 
According to Singer, “If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, 
equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far 
away from us (or we are far away from him)” (Singer 1972:232).  Of course, distance can 
be measured in both space and time, but one may question whether the two factors are 
parallel in a morally significant way.  Singer and Rachels argue only that if there are 
morally sound reasons for saving fellow humans from dystopic situations, such reasons 
do not depend on spatial proximity.  I suggest that according to the AFV, they should 
not depend on temporal proximity, either.  If anthropocentrists should be concerned for 
fellow humans that currently exist, regardless of their spatial proximity to us, they 
should be equally concerned for those that will exist in the future, regardless of how far 
into the future they will exist.9  As stated previously, personalistic principles limit one’s 
moral obligations to identifiable persons, who are typically part of one’s own 
communities, thus egoistically limiting the moral community to a tiny fraction of 
humanity.  Singer and Rachels argue in favor of humanistic principles in which the moral 
                                                          
9 In Chapter One, I discussed Saul Smilansky’s argument against the relevance of temporal proximity.  
Smilansky invokes what might be construed as a reversal of the AFV, an Axiom of Past Value. 
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community includes all humans on the planet.  Accepting the AFV, the community is 
expanded to include not only those humans who currently exist but also future 
members of our species and our evolutionary descendants.  Rachels has a response for 
those who would reject such a conclusion on the grounds that it does not conform to 
their intuitions.  “Rather than being perceptions of the truth, our 'intuitions' might 
sometimes signify nothing more than our prejudices or selfishness or cultural 
conditioning” (Rachels 1979:160).  Singer acknowledges a much deeper criticism, 
however.  If no one on the planet were allowed to starve to death, the population crisis 
would likely be much more severe than it is at present. 
I accept that the earth cannot support indefinitely a population rising at 
the present rate.  This certainly poses a problem for anyone who thinks it 
important to prevent famine.  Again, however, one could accept the 
argument without drawing the conclusion that it absolves one from any 
obligation to do anything to prevent famine.  The conclusion that should 
be drawn is that the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is 
population control (Singer 1972:240). 
Ideally, of course, such population control would be coupled with feeding the hungry.  If 
egoistically or misanthropically interpreted, a call for population control could lead to 
ecofascism. 
3.8 Lifeboat Earth and the Tragedy of the Commons 
Garrett Hardin claims that the humanism expressed by thinkers like Singer and 
Rachels would ultimately generate more harms than benefits for humanity.  Whereas 
Singer and Rachels emphasize our duties to alleviate the suffering of current humans, 
Hardin insists that we have stronger duties to protect the resource base for those in the 
future.  As he puts it, “For posterity’s sake we should never send food to any population 
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that is beyond the realistic carrying capacity of its land” (Hardin 1976:131).  “Every life 
saved this year in a poor country diminishes the quality of life for subsequent 
generations” (Hardin 1974:565).  Instead of funneling vital resources to those born into 
ecologically or economically challenging circumstances, Hardin argues that we should sit 
back and allow the carrying capacity of the land to establish sustainable populations.  
According to Hardin, since the Earth has a finite amount of resources but an 
exponentially growing human population, we are essentially in a lifeboat situation.  Thus, 
we the wealthy are justified in making self-serving, life-or-death decisions.  The 
comparatively wealthy have more than enough resources to consume frivolously and 
keep themselves comfortably afloat, whereas the poor lack even the most basic 
necessities and must tread water in hopes of being admitted to a well-provisioned 
lifeboat or of at least receiving handouts that will enable them to continue treading 
water a bit longer.  Hardin argues that humanistic sentiments like those of Singer and 
Rachels to allow the poor of the world to overrun the lifeboats of the wealthy would be 
devastating.  “The boat is swamped, and everyone drowns.  Complete justice, complete 
catastrophe” (ibid.:562).  According to Hardin, if the wealthy shared their resources with 
all those who are in need, eventually everyone would be in the same wretched 
condition of poverty since the poor reproduce at unsustainable rates that are much 
higher than those of the wealthy.  The wealthy would thereby squander the resources 
they could otherwise save for their descendants, ultimately condemning them to tread 
water with the rest of humanity.  In Hardin’s words: 
We cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among all present peoples, 
so long as people reproduce at different rates, because to do so would 
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guarantee that our grandchildren—everyone's grandchildren—would 
have only a ruined world to inhabit (ibid.:567). 
 
In the end, either there would be no resources left to sustain humanity, or there would 
be insufficient resources to sustain lives worth living.   
Hardin assumes that if the wealthy let the poor fend for themselves, human 
populations would roughly stabilize at their habitat’s carrying capacity, as happens in 
the case of nonhuman species classified as K-strategists, with cyclical fluctuations as a 
result of changing environmental conditions.  The human carrying capacity of any 
particular area—i.e., that area’s capacity to sustain the lives of its human inhabitants—is 
largely determined by the size of its population coupled with the population’s 
consumption patterns, cultural practices (including agricultural practices), and so on in 
relation to the available resources, climatic conditions, and various other natural 
selection pressures.  However, Hardin is mainly concerned with the disproportionately 
large population size and rate of reproduction of the global poor rather than with the 
disproportionately large consumption rate and ecological footprint of the global wealthy.  
In other words, Hardin assumes that the size of a population is more critical than the 
population’s consumption pattern in determining carrying capacity.  Hardin argues that 
we must consider the larger ecological context, or situation, in which the poor of the 
world find themselves before deciding to help them.  For the good of future humans, if 
the poor have exceeded the land’s carrying capacity, we should let nature run its course. 
The morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time 
the act is performed—this is the foundation stone of situationist, 
ecological ethics.  A time-blind absolute ethical principle like that implied 
by the shibboleth, "the sanctity of life," leads to greater suffering than its 
situationist, ecological alternative—and ultimately and paradoxically, 
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even to a lesser quantity of life over a sufficiently long period of time.  
The interests of posterity can be brought into the reckoning of ethics if 
we abandon the idea of the sanctity of (present) life as an absolute 
ethical ideal, replacing it with the idea of the sanctity of the carrying 
capacity (Hardin 1976:133). 
 
Echoing Hardin’s warning that a tragedy of the commons is in the making, many 
ecologists claim that humans have already exceeded our planet’s carrying capacity, 
having achieved what is referred to as overshoot. 
Human activities have exceeded the biosphere’s capacity since the 1980s.  
This overshoot can be expressed as the extent to which human area 
demand exceeds nature’s supply:  whereas humanity’s load 
corresponded to 70% of the biosphere’s capacity in 1961, this percentage 
grew to 120% by 1999.  In other words, 20% overshoot means that it 
would require 1.2 earths, or one earth for 1.2 years, to regenerate what 
humanity used in 1999 (Wackernagel et al. 2002:9268). 
 
If humans have indeed achieved overshoot, it is most likely due to the combination of 
overpopulation and overconsumption.  However, since particular individuals and the 
societies to which they belong consume resources at highly different rates, collective 
overconsumption seems to be the chief culprit.  As people around the world adopt the 
high-energy lifestyles of the West, their energy consumption increases substantially.  
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China recently overtook 
the United States to become first in total primary energy consumption.10  If we also 
consider India’s emerging economy and growing population, the prospects for 
addressing overshoot appear dire.  Consider Stan Cox’s observation that, “If India alone 
adopted the consumption pattern typical in the US, the global ecological impact would 
be as if the world’s population had doubled” (Cox 2008:114).  In order to reverse 
                                                          
10 http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=CHN. 
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overshoot, either the human population or its unsustainable rates of consumption and 
ecologically devastating cultural practices would have to be drastically altered.  If all 
human lives counted equally and were treated with the regard expressed by Singer and 
Rachels, it is the lifestyles of Earth’s wealthy that would be sacrificed.  If the ‘quality’ of 
human life counted most, as it presumably does for Hardin, then the overpopulated 
poor would be allowed to die, or, in Rachels’ terminology, passively euthanized.  What 
Hardin has not adequately addressed, however, is the irony that without many of the 
poor to supply cheap labor for the production of goods and services consumed by the 
wealthy, the system of inequality that enables the wealthy to have ‘quality’ lives would 
not be possible.  Cox explains: 
We [in the developed nations] continue to enjoy the high-energy life, and 
our economies goad those of less wealthy nations to follow our example.  
Then we carp about their having too many people while we take full 
advantage of the cheap labor power that those “too many people” can 
provide.  (ibid.:114—115) 
 
 Holmes Rolston offers a nonanthropocentric argument that converges with 
Hardin’s future-oriented, anthropocentric, contractarian egoism.  Each foresees a 
tragedy of the commons arising if Earth’s resources are fairly distributed among the 
poor and the wealthy, and each argues that it is thus sometimes necessary that the lives 
of the poor should be sacrificed for the greater good—of humanity for Hardin and of the 
Earth for Rolston.  They make these claims in spite of the fact that the comparatively 
wealthy humans living in industrialized, consumer societies have exponentially larger 
ecological and consumer footprints than the global poor and are thus disproportionately 
more responsible for accelerating humanity’s ecological predicament.  It may appear 
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that the wealthy have not exceeded their land’s carrying capacity but only because they 
exploit resources from all over the planet and keep their own land at least as ‘green’ as 
the law or local custom requires.  When it comes to ecological footprints, it takes 
roughly 20 average Rwandans to equal the footprint of one average American.  In other 
words, roughly 20 Rwandans would need to be sacrificed in order to free up sufficient 
resources to support the frivolous lifestyle of a single American (BBC 2009).  Hardin 
justifies the vast disparity that exists between the haves and have-nots by referencing 
property laws that were (rather conveniently) written by those whose wealth was 
unfairly inherited.  “It is literally true that we Americans of non-Indian ancestry are the 
descendants of thieves” (Hardin 1974:567).  However, 
The law long ago invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection 
of pure justice, in the interest of preventing massive disorder.  The law 
zealously defends property rights—but only recent property rights.  It is 
as though the physical principle of exponential decay applies to property 
rights.  Drawing a line in time may be unjust, but any other action is 
practically worse (ibid.:567). 
 
Although Rolston acknowledges that the poor have “a right to a more equitable 
distribution of the goods of the Earth that we, the wealthy, think we absolutely own” 
(Rolston 1996:264), he seems opposed to having such a right fulfilled.  Instead, Rolston 
echoes the egoism of Hardin’s lifeboat ethic by pessimistically proclaiming, “Even if 
there were an equitable distribution of wealth, the human population cannot go on 
escalating without people becoming all equally poor” (ibid.:259).  Of course, Rolston 
does not intend for humanity to live in universal poverty, especially since this would 
have a negative impact on the biosphere.  He therefore attempts to justify the wealthy’s 
disregard of the poor in a manner similar to Hardin’s, by referencing cultural norms.   
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Instead of donating to charities to feed the poor, the wealthy typically spend their 
excess money on unnecessary things that give them pleasure.  Presumably, according to 
Rolston, the widespread acceptance of this common practice makes it somehow morally 
permissible. 
Every time we buy a Christmas gift for a wife or husband, or go to a 
symphony concert, or give a college education to a child, or drive a late 
model car home, or turn on the air conditioner, we spend money that 
might have helped to eradicate poverty.  We mostly choose to do things 
we value more than feeding the hungry.   
 
An ethicist may reply, yes, that is the fact of the matter.  But no 
normative ought follows from the description of this behavior.  We ought 
not to behave so.  But such widespread behavior, engaged in almost 
universally by persons who regard themselves as being ethical, including 
readers of this article, is strong evidence that we in fact not only have 
these norms but think we ought to have them.  To be sure, we also think 
that charity is appropriate, and we censure those who are wholly 
insensitive to the plight of others.  But we place decisions here on a scale 
of degree, and we do not feel guilty about all these other values we 
pursue, while yet some people somewhere on earth are starving (ibid. 
1996:250).   
 
Robin Attfield argues that Rolston’s appeal to cultural norms seems to undercut 
his arguments elsewhere against the status quo.  If Rolston’s defense of the wealthy is 
based on cultural relativism, he loses grounds upon which to challenge ecologically 
irresponsible behaviors that are also commonly practiced and accepted. 
More generally, the moral assumptions of behaviour in the contemporary 
world cannot be allowed to form the basis of critical normative ethics; for 
on this basis it would make no sense to urge that the status quo warrants 
criticism and ought to change.  Yet this is something which environmental 
ethicists usually both want and need to urge (Attfield 1998:292—293). 
 
In response to Attfield and his other critics on this matter, Rolston claims: 
One of my main points is that the 'feeding people' gained by 'sacrificing 
nature' is, in most cases, only a temporary solution to a problem that 
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needs to be solved at its roots in the birthrate patterns or social 
inequities that result in hunger.  Else, one will find, a decade later, that 
the people are hungry again, because the problem was not attacked in 
the right place.  . . .  On this spectacular planet, with many millions of 
species, maybe it is astonishing anthropocentrism to hold that people 
always come first, no matter what their mistakes, no matter where their 
uncontrolled growth (Rolston 1998:352). 
 
I nowhere said that 'we' are guiltless.  I did say that 'we' Americans (and 
everybody else) sometimes correctly give priority to other values besides 
feeding the poor (ibid.:353).  . . .  I run the risk of being misanthropic; that 
is better than to risk being an arrogant humanist (ibid.:356). 
 
Rolston’s argument against helping the poor is specifically addressed to the poor 
whose continued existence would likely threaten endangered species by taking away 
land or other resources that such species would require.  Rolston argues that on the 
African continent, where many species such as the black rhinoceros are critically 
endangered, there are too many humans interfering with the land’s carrying capacity.   
Starkly put, the growth of culture has become cancerous.  That is hardly a 
metaphor, for a cancer is essentially an explosion of unregulated growth.  
Feeding people always seems humane, but, when we face up to what is 
really going on, by just feeding people, without attention to the larger 
social results, we could be feeding a kind of cancer (Rolston 1996:258—
259). 
 
One can say that where there is a hungry mouth, one should do what it 
takes to get food into it.  But when there are two mouths there the next 
day, and four the day after that, and sixteen the day after that, one needs 
a more complex answer.  . . .  We have to figure in where such persons 
are located on the population curve, and realize that a good thing when 
human numbers are manageable is no longer a good thing when such a 
person is really another cell of cancerous growth.  That sounds cruel, and 
it is tragic, but it does not cease to be true for these reasons (ibid.:259). 
 
From Rolston’s contextual perspective, a human being is essentially “a cell of cancerous 
growth” when s/he has been born into severely economically and ecologically 
challenging circumstances.  Although the comparatively wealthy are largely to blame for 
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the rapidly spreading cancer of environmental degradation, Rolston does not argue that 
their demise would improve the evolutionary success of the black rhinoceros or other 
endangered species.  Endangered species cannot be saved from extinction by the short-
term sacrifice of the poor if the wealthy continue to frivolously squander resources such 
that other poor are pressured into situations in which they must compete with such 
species in order to survive.  In fairness to Rolston, he is generally both a strong defender 
of human rights and a harsh critic of consumer society’s effects on the environment.  
However, consumers in the developed world may take comfort from his Hardinian 
carrying-capacity argument.  It seems to imply that they may continue living in denial of 
their complicity with corporations in exploiting the poor of the developing world and in 
helping perpetuate the socioeconomic conditions that continue conditions of poverty 
for large numbers, fueling lower education, higher unemployment, higher reproduction, 
and greater reliance on the immediate environment for survival necessities—including 
an increasing reliance on bush meat, which includes endangered species. 
Those who are born into the most economically and ecologically challenging 
conditions experience most directly what it means to be in a lifeboat situation by having 
to live off the land when resources are limited and shrinking.  When vital resources are 
scarce, the metaphorical lifeboat that the land represents exceeds its carrying capacity 
for humans and nonhumans alike.  Comparing humans in such dire conditions to a 
cancerous growth is akin to blessing their eradication.  Robin Attfield thus criticizes 
Rolston’s overt misanthropy toward the poor. 
The possibility of extinctions has long been known, without usually 
inclining those aware of it to the vocabulary of pathology.  Granted the 
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strong grounds for preserving species, agents should certainly adopt 
concerted preservationist policies (and, where relevant, population 
policies to prevent unsustainable population growth too), but need not 
simultaneously regard their own existence and agency as some kind of 
cosmic curse (Attfield 1998:300). 
By adopting a vocabulary of pathology to refer to the poor, philosophers like Rolston 
misrepresent the real problem.  Since a human population’s practices are generally 
more significant than its size in determining ecological degradation, environmentalists 
should be primarily concerned with reducing the ecological footprints of developed 
nations—whether by calling for reductions in population or for expansions of 
environmentally sustainable practices.  At the same time, environmentalists should call 
on governments of the developed world to assist the poor whose existence puts 
pressure on endangered species through voluntary education and relocation programs. 
If environmentalists such as Rolston acknowledge that the global poor are detrimental 
to the health of the environment, they must emphasize that the global wealthy are 
much more so, especially if they exert their unsustainably enormous ecological 
footprints on a geologic timescale.  Since the ecological footprints of consumers in 
developed nations tend to be exponentially greater than those of consumers in the 
developing nations where nonhuman species are threatened with extinction, the 
governments of the developed world should be acknowledged to have stronger duties 
to alleviate the ecological predicament. 
3.9 Mass Extinction – Crossing a Dangerous Threshold 
If death is a harm, it is a harm for individual organisms.  Extinction should thus be 
considered a meta-harm since it is the death of an entire species.  As Holmes Rolston 
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states it, “Extinction kills forms (species)—not just individuals; it kills collectively, not 
just distributively.  Killing a natural kind is the death of birth, not just of an individual life.  
The historical lineage is stopped forever” (Rolston 1996:265).  From an 
environmentalist’s perspective, causing a species to go extinct is among the worst 
harms that can be committed.  Environmentalists therefore condone policies that 
protect, as far as possible, the rights of all species to exist within their native ranges and 
to expand their ranges on natural spatiotemporal scales.  Although species are always 
on the move, taking advantage of niches that become available, the geologic record can 
indicate which regions have been typically inhabited by a particular species.  The 
geologic record also indicates the typical rates at which species go extinct.  Because 
anthropogenic extinctions exponentially surpass the normal, background rate of 
extinction, it is apparent that a critical threshold has already been crossed.  Recall 
Benton’s explanation of the normal rate:   
The background rate of extinction may be only 10 to 20% of species per 
million years—10 or 20 species out of every 100 disappear every million 
years, which translates to one or two species per 100 every 100,000 years 
(Benton 2003:135). 
 
The rate at which species are currently going extinct or otherwise altered through 
adaptation to selection pressures is beginning to occur on a human rather than a 
geologic timescale.  The presence of Homo sapiens is in fact quickly becoming one of the 
planet’s most powerful selection pressures, perhaps best compared to the abiotic 
factors of Earth’s past—such as cosmic collisions, prolonged volcanic eruptions, and so 
on—which were drivers of the previous five major mass extinction events of the past 
600 million years that befell eukaryotic organisms like us.  Coinciding with humanity’s 
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dispersal into novel ecosystems over the past 50,000 to 70,000 years, native mammalian 
species and genera have steadily gone extinct at rates exponentially exceeding the 
natural background rate.   
According to estimates of the biologist Wilson, species are dying 
worldwide at a rate of about three per hour, or more than seventy per 
day, and 27,000 per year, each a unique specimen of life that has 
gradually come to be over hundreds of thousands of years.  Extrapolating 
from present trends, we can expect an even greater increase in the loss 
of species.  Pimm and Raven estimate that the extinction rate in the 
middle of this century may be about 50,000 per million species and 
decade.  If we assume that approximately one species per year 
disappeared before the coming of humankind, this translates to a rate of 
species extinction that is more than one thousandfold greater than the 
natural one (Gorke 2003:1). 
 
When habitats are altered or occupied by humans, their native, longstanding 
compositions are disrupted, with the largest mammals the most vulnerable to 
displacement or extinction because they require more space and resources than other 
organisms do.  When surrounding habitats are also occupied or altered by humans, 
large mammals lose access to the migratory routes or resources needed to remain 
viable.  They become critically endangered and, in terms of their role in ecosystem 
processes, are functionally extinct.  Their complete extinction is almost guaranteed to 
take place on a scale of time that is recognizably human.  However, the disappearance 
of a species leaves a permanent mark on a geologic scale.  Every time that humans 
extirpate a species, there are ecological repercussions, which may be indiscernible at 
first.  However, the more species that we extinguish, the greater the long-term effects 
are likely to be.  According to Benton: 
Low levels of extinction can turn into high levels.  Destroying species and 
habitats piecemeal might lead to a runaway crisis, as seems to have 
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happened in the past.  Once the world becomes locked into a spiral of 
downward decline, it is impossible to see how any intervention by 
humans could turn it back.  It could be, for example, that removing one 
or two species from an ecosystem does little damage.  The remaining 
species can adapt and plug the gaps.  But if another few species are 
picked off, then another few, and then a few more, a point may be 
reached when that ecosystem will collapse.  Better to stop destroying the 
environment before we become locked into such a catastrophic 
sequence of events.  The natural world is complex, and consequences are 
often unpredictable (Benton 2003:299). 
 
In considering the mass extinction events of the past, Rolston adopts a geologic 
view to argue that such extinctions are necessary for evolution to take place, since 
without such events life would come to a stagnant bottleneck.  Once available niches 
have been filled, mass extinctions open the door for new forms to emerge.  Rolston 
considers such a process to be ultimately positive, creative, and value-generating. 
These periodic cutbacks prepare the way for more complex diversity later 
on.  We first think that the catastrophic extinctions were quite a bad 
thing, an unlucky disaster.  But in fact they were good luck.  Indeed, were 
it not for such extinctions we humans would not be here, nor would any 
of the mammalian complexity.  Life on Earth is so resilient that normal 
geological processes lack the power to cause widespread extinctions in 
major groups.  But just such a resetting is needed—rarely but periodically 
(at least on a geologic time scale).  We should think twice before judging 
these catastrophic extinctions to be a bad thing (Rolston 1994:48). 
 
Rolston’s approval of mass extinctions is due to their causal role in producing ‘complex’ 
forms such as humans.  As William Grey notes, an attitude such as that expressed by 
Rolston seems altogether un-nonanthropocentric. 
There is of course an excellent reason for us to retrospectively evaluate 
these great planetary disruptions positively from our current position in 
planetary history, and that is that we can recognise their occurrence as a 
necessary condition for our own existence.  But what could be more 
anthropocentric than that?  However, as Gould has pointed out, mass 
extinctions are awful for those who are caught up in them (Grey 
1993:469). 
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Rolston next appears to reverse his position on mass extinction by stating that the 
current anthropogenic one is inherently bad. 
There is one conclusion we must not draw from this.  One might say, 
“Well, if catastrophic extinctions are so innovative, perhaps we need not 
worry about the anthropogenic ones.”  Yet that fails to take into account 
the radical differences between natural and anthropogenic extinctions.  
Anthropogenic extinction has nothing to do with evolutionary speciation.  
Hundreds of thousands of species will perish because of culturally altered 
environments that are far different from the spontaneous environments 
in which such species were naturally selected and in which they 
sometimes become extinct.  In a natural extinction, nature takes away life, 
when it has become unfit in habitat or when the habitat alters, and 
supplies other life in its place.  Artificial extinction shuts down tomorrow, 
because it shuts down speciation altogether.  Natural extinction typically 
occurs with transformation, either of the extinct line or related or 
competing lines.  Artificial extinction is without issue.  One opens the 
doors; the other closes them.  In artificial extinctions, humans generate 
and regenerate nothing; they only dead-end these lines.  There can be 
little respeciation on toxic soils and none at all on asphalt (Rolston 
1994:49). 
 
There is a clear inconsistency here that results from an error in reasoning.  
Rolston’s approval of past mass extinctions is based on a holistic rationalist’s utilization 
of a geologic timescale, but his disapproval of the anthropogenic one is based on a 
timescale that is much more parochial.  Although Rolston begins his analysis by 
positively valuing mass extinctions of the past, he then commits a disanalogy by 
comparing natural, background extinctions, which Benton indicates to be “one or two 
species per 100 every 100,000 years,” to the anthropogenic mass extinction, which 
involves an exponentially larger loss in species over a brief period of time.  While there 
is indeed a radical difference between background extinctions and mass extinctions, 
there is not a radical difference between mass extinctions of the past and the current, 
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anthropogenic one.  It is precisely their striking similarity that makes the current mass 
extinction event so disturbing to environmentalists.  Rolston is simply mistaken in 
claiming that there will be no respeciation after the anthropogenic mass extinction 
event, although it will likely take place on a nonanthropocentric scale of time similar to 
the one that followed the K-T event 65 million years ago.  Of course, humans and their 
asphalt will no longer be around to witness the respeciation, but that is beside the point.  
The end-Permian mass extinction event 265 million years ago wiped out perhaps 95% of 
all life forms on our planet, a figure much greater than the number that will likely be 
extirpated by humans.  It took approximately 100 million years for species richness to 
‘return’ to pre-extinction levels.  If, according to Rolston’s adoption of holistic 
rationalism, a mass extinction such as the end-Permian event is to be viewed in a 
positive light, then for consistency’s sake the current mass extinction event should also 
be viewed as a good thing overall. 
 If Rolston’s holistic rationalism were consistently expressed, he would have no 
grounds for criticizing extinctions of any kind, anthropogenic or otherwise.  Callicott 
rejects holistic rationalism for this reason. 
Considering our time as but an infinitesimal moment of the three-and-
one-half-billion-year tenure of life on planet earth (let alone the 
possibility that earth may be but one of many planets to possess a biota), 
man's tendency to destroy other species might be viewed quite 
disinterestedly as a transitional stage in the earth's evolutionary 
odyssey.  ...  A holistic rationalist could not regret the massive die-off of 
the late Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammal-
populated world.  The Age of Mammals may yet likewise end.  But the 
"laws" of organic evolution and of ecology (if any there be) will remain 
operative.  Nonhuman life would go on even after a nuclear holocaust.  In 
time speciation would occur and species would radiate anew.  Future 
"intelligent" forms of life may even feel grateful, if not to us then to their 
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God (or the Good), for making their world possible.  The new Age (of 
Insects, perhaps) would eventually be just as diverse, orderly, 
harmonious, and stable and thus no less good than our current 
ecosystem with its present complement of species (Callicott 1989:142). 
 
However, in discussing why he believes the geologic scale is not morally meaningful, 
Callicott makes claims similar to those of Rolston.  Like Rolston, Callicott’s analysis of 
past mass extinctions does not match his strong disapproval of the current one. 
The last great extinction event, which occurred 65 million years ago, is 
not reprehensible.  Nor does the expectation that in 50 million years 
biodiversity will have bounced back from the anthropogenic mass 
extinction event now in progress let us off the ethical hook.  We should 
not fret over the deep past, nor should we exonerate ourselves by 
contemplating the deep future (Callicott 2002:297). 
 
Because Callicott rejects the moral relevance of a geologic scale, he finds nothing 
reprehensible about the K-T event.  According to his human-centered, ecological scale, 
however, he is able to find fault with the current anthropogenic mass extinction event.  
Nevertheless, in order to identify what exactly is wrong with current extinctions, 
Callicott must utilize a geologic scale to highlight the abnormal rate at which they are 
taking place. 
Normally, speciation out paces extinction—which is the reason why 
biodiversity has increased over time.  So, what is land-ethically wrong 
with current anthropogenic species extinction?  Species extinction is not 
unnatural.  On the contrary, species extinction—anthropogenic or 
otherwise—is perfectly natural.  But the current rate of extinction is 
wildly abnormal.  Does being the first biological agent of a geologically 
significant mass extinction event in the 3.5-billion-year tenure of life on 
Planet Earth morally become us Homo sapiens?  Doesn't that make a 
mockery of the self-congratulatory species epithet:  the sapient, the wise 
species of the genus Homo (Callicott 1999:136)? 
 
During the history of life on Earth, speciation and extinction have normally occurred on 
a geologic rather ecological scale of time.  Also, since Callicott references the billions of 
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years that life has been present on Earth in order to highlight what should be morally 
condemned about abnormal anthropogenic extinctions, it should be clear even to 
himself that he does find a geologic scale morally relevant.  Furthermore, if nonhuman 
life forms are intrinsically valuable and can be harmed, as Callicott, Rolston, and other 
nonanthropocentrists repeatedly affirm, then their extinction is decidedly a bad thing—
at least, for them.  Mass extinctions are the most apocalyptic ecological events that can 
take place on our planet.  Just because a mass extinction took place several million years 
ago, that does not lessen the harms that were inflicted on the life forms that existed 
then.  Such an extinction may not have been bad for humans, but to claim further that 
they were bad for no other life forms is a short-sighted anthropocentric conclusion that 
fails to acknowledge that harms can befall nonhumans as well.   
Environmentalists such as Callicott and Rolston, who only consider the mass 
extinction of current life forms to be a bad thing, seem to regard such nonhumanity as 
more intrinsically valuable than any that existed in the geologic past or that could 
opportunistically exist in the geologic future as new niches are opened up by human 
activities.  What is it that makes current species so valuable?  The best response seems 
to be an anthropocentric one.  Such species have existed alongside Homo sapiens 
throughout its evolutionary history.  Witnessing the demise of all these species may be 
akin to seeing the canary die in the coal mine.  It is a dire warning of what awaits Homo 
sapiens if the conditions in the ‘coal mine’ do not change.  Of course, life will ‘bounce 
back.’  The life forms that will exist in the distant future as a result of the anthropogenic 
mass extinction event may be more numerous and ‘complex’ than those that would 
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have existed otherwise.  Regardless, the use of a geologic spatiotemporal scale should 
not produce radical stoicism regarding humanity’s influence on the biosphere, as would 
be the case for one who consistently adopted rational holism.  Instead, it should make 
us reconsider what type of legacy we are bestowing upon future life forms, humans and 
nonhumans alike. 
Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016 
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Chapter Four:  Conclusion 
4.1 What Have We Learned So Far? 
Throughout the dissertation I have argued that, as predicted by Norton’s 
convergence hypothesis, those who subscribe to ecological anthropocentrism would 
tend to endorse the same sorts of policies that would be endorsed by proponents of 
“reasonable” forms of nonanthropocentrism.  I have demonstrated that those 
environmentalists identified by Norton’s hypothesis subscribe to the AFV since they 
openly profess their toleration of humanity’s continued existence—in spite of the 
immense atrocities that human societies have committed against nature.  Any 
environmental ethic that is worthy of rational support must be both fundamentally 
nonindividualistic and long-sighted since the spatiotemporal scales that are deemed 
morally considerable by individuals do not adequately consider ecological wholes or 
individuals’ complicit participation in collective-action wrongs.  
Environmental problems involve an asymmetrical problem in decision 
scale—actions that are rational from an individual viewpoint lead 
inexorably to the destruction of a public, community-level value that 
emerges on a larger and more long-term scale.  . . .  Since environmental 
problems result from large-scale impacts of cumulative trends in 
individual decisions, multi-generational values are the ones that are 
relevant to assessing the choices, the options, and the opportunities 
available to future people (Norton 2000:38).  
What I hope to have made clear is that subscribing to the AFV requires one to 
acknowledge the moral relevance of a geologic spatiotemporal scale.  Since the aim of 
the AFV is the long-term evolutionary success of our species and our evolutionary 
descendants, and given that such success would be measured in millions of years, a 
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scale that encompasses a handful of centuries or millennia would cover the merest 
fraction of our species’ future. 
Callicott argues that the emergence of environmental philosophy coincided with 
a paradigm shift in ethics, that, in fact, human societies are ready for the next step in 
the evolution of morality.  He claims that the chief characteristic of the new paradigm is 
that humans are not the only entities that are acknowledged to have intrinsic value.  
While I agree with Callicott that a new paradigm is emerging, the shift is not due to an 
expansion of the entities that are intrinsically valued by humans.  Instead, the paradigm 
shift concerns a conceptual revision of anthropocentrism.  Being environmentally 
human-centered does not imply that all nonhuman aspects of the world must be 
“quantified on a monetary metric” (Callicott 2009:144). 
Neither economic productivity nor aesthetic and intergenerational moral 
values can be protected without protecting the complex, organized 
system that provides the ecological context on which all values depend.  
To assume that all values are economic values is to ignore this implicit, 
background value in the ecological processes that support economic, and 
all other, activity (Norton 1991:196). 
 
Anthropocentrism’s new paradigm is ecological and thus recognizes that since humans 
are part of nature, it is in their interest to maintain the stability, integrity, health, and so 
on of the ecosystems and other natural resources that promote the satisfaction of the 
full range of human values that are worthy of rational support.   
I hope that I have demonstrated that nonanthropocentrists such as Callicott 
bank too heavily on the practical effectiveness of the concept of intrinsic value.  A 
tremendous amount of human suffering exists in the world that could be alleviated by 
governments that presumably pursue anthropocentric policies.  However, the 
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widespread acknowledgement within such societies that humans are intrinsically 
valuable has not compelled them to pay much more than lip service to the human rights 
of those who suffer.  Thus, the expectations of nonanthropocentrists regarding what 
would follow from the widespread acknowledgement in these societies of 
nonhumanity’s intrinsic value seems to be more an article of faith than to be based on 
empirical observations.  Since the ecological predicament is global in nature, 
encompassing indeed the entire biosphere, the number of entities involved drastically 
exceeds that of the humans whose plight is widely ignored.  Whether by choice or not, 
most people are ignorant of the effects of their everyday behaviors on extant fellow 
humans.  An act as seemingly benign as consuming a chocolate bar, if performed by 
enough people, may be essential to maintaining the practice of slavery in places like the 
Ivory Coast.  With less demand for chocolate, the owners of cocoa plantations in such 
places would at least maintain fewer slaves.  “And because Côte d’Ivoire supplies 43 
percent of the world’s supply of cocoa beans and is the primary supplier to U.S. 
chocolate makers, there is a lot of chocolate out there on American retail shelves with 
the slavery taint” (Schwartz 2010:24).  If we are blind to our complicit participation in 
collective actions that increase the plight of fellow humans who are spatially distant 
from us, we are doubly blind regarding our effects on those who are temporally distant.  
The same goes for our ignorance regarding the effects of our collective actions on 
nonhumanity in general. 
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4.2 Looking Forward – The Problem of Nero’s Fiddle 
One might ask:  So what is the point of this dissertation?  Haven’t I just 
suggested that the ecological predicament is irremediable?  I acknowledge that given 
the track record of human societies, there is indeed little reason to hope that problems 
as complex as global warming, mass extinction, biotic homogenization, and the 
proliferation of invasive species will be adequately addressed.  If such problems are 
indeed capable of being alleviated, this will require the unprecedented, immediate, and 
prolonged cooperation of most nations on Earth.  Andrew Fiala refers to this paradox as 
the problem of Nero’s Fiddle.  “The difficulty is that a focus on narrow and short-term 
interest can appear to be rational in the midst of a crisis—especially when the crisis 
appears to be hopelessly unsolvable” (Fiala 2010:53).  Unless the severity of the 
ecological predicament is adequately communicated to the public, it is unlikely that 
people will be motivated to alter those of their behaviors that contribute to the crisis. 
However, when environmentalists realistically convey what it would take to solve the 
problem, it appears that only immediate and prolonged global cooperation will be 
sufficient.  If one then considers the conflict, disagreement and competition that 
historically characterize relations among humans within states and across their borders, 
there is very little reason to expect the necessary cooperation to take place.  After 
thoroughly considering the predicament, it may indeed seem rational to conclude that 
the situation is hopeless.  Since the number of people willing to voluntarily sacrifice 
short-term pleasures for the sake of humanity’s long-term future is likely to be 
insufficient, any given person’s attempts to be ecologically responsible will seemingly be 
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for naught.  Thus, even the conscientious individual may conclude that it would be 
rational to fiddle while Rome burns, to adopt just the kind of selfish disregard for the 
environment and for future humans that would reinforce the problem. 
 Realistic assessments such as those of nonanthropocentrist Laura Westra that 
democratic institutions seem unlikely to remedy the ecological predicament add fuel to 
the pessimist’s fire and may only inspire more individuals to opt for egoism. 
Although changes in the balance of power between more and less 
developed countries, and within these between powerful and wealthy 
and disempowered groups, are desirable on other grounds, 
environmentally, no guaranteed success would ensue.  As long as the 
emphasis remains on atomistic, individualistic rights, even the desirable 
change of power among present holders of power and those who lack it, 
will not suffice.  There is nothing to prevent an individual in a less 
developed country to want desperately to enjoy not only freedom from 
famine and deprivation, but also parity with the life-style of more 
developed countries, with all their wasteful and unsafe practices.  Nor is 
there any ground or mechanism to prevent such occurrences, if civil 
liberties (desirable as they are) remain primary (Westra 1993:133). 
 
Norton acknowledges that humans may eventually face a future in which only a 
Leviathan could possibly stabilize Earth’s natural resources such that prospects for 
humanity’s long-term evolutionary success are strengthened.  As I have alluded to 
throughout the dissertation, such a future would be rife with Smilanskian regret.11 
The future would be justified in vilifying us if they face a world in which, 
for example, resource shortages are so severe that only a totalitarian 
government can sufficiently control population and limit access to over-
taxed resources, thus breaking their ties to earlier generations that have 
                                                          
11 I argued in Chapter One that Smilanskian regret should be tempered so that it does not morally require 
one to be willing to sacrifice his or her existence in order to ‘correct’ the sins of humanity.  However, 
Smilansky seems right in asserting that one who values humanity as such should nevertheless regret that 
his or her existence cannot be causally decoupled from such sins.  Furthermore, it is rational for extant 
humans to try to avoid creating a future in which their individual and collective actions are regrettable in 
Smilansky’s sense. 
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painfully evolved toward democratic control of governments (Norton 
2000:39). 
 
Fiala claims that if there is a solution to the paradox of Nero’s Fiddle, it is “to foster an 
alternative form of rationality that looks beyond short-term utility” (Fiala 2010:53).  
That is precisely one of ecological anthropocentrism’s main objectives.  According to 
proponents of ecological anthropocentrism, it is rational to prefer a universe in which 
humans flourish on a geologic spatiotemporal scale.  As Norton points out, this form of 
rationality requires that considered preferences take priority over merely felt ones. 
Ultimately, the central aim of the dissertation has been to demonstrate that 
ecological anthropocentrism provides a strong foundation for a rationally defensible 
environmental ethic.  I have also tried to demonstrate that the overall objectives of 
ecological anthropocentrists do not differ significantly from those of “reasonable” 
nonanthropocentrists because both of these types of environmentalists ultimately 
subscribe to the AFV.  If current human societies embrace the “alternative form of 
rationality” represented by proponents of ecological anthropocentrism, they will 
endorse policies that rational beings of Earth’s indefinite future would universally 
condone.  Consequently, such beings would have fewer reasons to regret the conditions 
that bring them into existence and would be less likely to condemn current humans as 
moral monsters.  Finally, I hope that the arguments I have presented will help convince 
environmentalists with disparate beliefs about ultimate values to realize that such 
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differences of opinion should not prevent them from working together to promote 
policies aimed at a better future for humans and nonhumans alike.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016 
                                                          
12 Presumably, a ‘better’ future for nonhumans is one in which, among other things, anthropogenic 
extinctions do not exponentially outpace geologically normal, background extinctions, and ecosystem 
processes provide stable ‘services’ for all Earth’s life forms. 
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